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AUTOMATING FDA REGULATION
MASON MARKS†
ABSTRACT
In the twentieth century, the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) rose to prominence as a respected scientific agency. By the
middle of the century, it transformed the U.S. medical marketplace
from an unregulated haven for dangerous products and false claims to
a respected exemplar of public health. More recently, the FDA’s
objectivity has increasingly been questioned. Critics argue the agency
has become overly political and too accommodating to industry while
lowering its standards for safety and efficacy. The FDA’s accelerated
pathways for product testing and approval are partly to blame. They
require lower-quality evidence, such as surrogate endpoints, and shift
the FDA’s focus from premarket clinical trials toward postmarket
surveillance, requiring less evidence up front while promising
enhanced scrutiny on the back end. To further streamline product
testing and approval, the FDA is adopting outputs from computer
models, enhanced by artificial intelligence (“AI”), as surrogates for
direct evidence of safety and efficacy.
This Article analyzes how the FDA uses computer models and
simulations to save resources, reduce costs, infer product safety and
efficacy, and make regulatory decisions. To test medical products, the
FDA assembles cohorts of virtual humans and conducts digital clinical
trials. Using molecular modeling, it simulates how substances interact
with cellular targets to predict adverse effects and determine how drugs
should be regulated. Though legal scholars have commented on the
role of AI as a medical product that is regulated by the FDA, they have
largely overlooked the role of AI as a medical product regulator.
Modeling and simulation could eventually reduce the exposure of
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volunteers to risks and help protect the public. However, these
technologies lower safety and efficacy standards and may erode public
trust in the FDA while undermining its transparency, accountability,
objectivity, and legitimacy. Bias in computer models and simulations
may prioritize efficiency and speed over other values such as
maximizing safety, equity, and public health. By analyzing FDA
guidance documents and industry and agency simulation standards,
this Article offers recommendations for safer and more equitable
automation of FDA regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
In the twentieth century, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) rose to prominence as a respected scientific agency.1 By the
middle of the century, it had transformed the U.S. medical marketplace
from an unregulated haven for dangerous products and false claims to
an exemplar of public health.2 In 1962, the Kefauver-Harris
Amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)
empowered the agency to require proof of drug efficacy, instead of
safety alone, prior to regulatory approval.3
As a result, the modern phased system of clinical trials became the
norm for generating scientific knowledge regarding new therapeutics.4
Though these changes protected the public, they made the FDA
approval process longer and more expensive.5 In the 1980s, drug
companies and patient advocates pressured the agency to streamline
its procedures.6 In response, the FDA developed pathways to
accelerate product testing and approval.7 Most allow the agency to rely
on surrogate endpoints—measurements such as laboratory tests—that
substitute for direct evidence of symptomatic improvement.8

1. See DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 73–75 (2014) (describing how the FDA’s
response to a series of public health disasters, such as the thalidomaide scandal and sulfamilamide
tragedy, contributed to the agency’s reputation in the twentieth century).
2. 80 Years of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July
11, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-history-exhibits/80-years-federal-food-drug-andcosmetic-act [https://perma.cc/V3U8-VKXF] (describing harmful and deceptively marketed
products of the early twentieth century displayed in the FDA’s Chamber of Horrors Photo
Gallery, and noting that the FDA transformed the medical product marketplace following
enactment of landmark legislation, such as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938).
3. Jeremy A. Greene & Scott H. Podolsky, Reform, Regulation, and Pharmaceuticals—the
Kefauver-Harris Amendments at 50, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1481, 1481 (2012).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1482.
6. See Jonathan J. Darrow, Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, New FDA BreakthroughDrug Category — Implications for Patients, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1252, 1257 (2014) [hereinafter
Darrow, Avorn & Kesselheim, New FDA Breakthrough-Drug Category] (explaining how some
patient advocacy groups argue that lengthy FDA approval requirements delay access to
treatments and restrict personal autonomy).
7. Id. at 1253.
8. See Kevin Knopf, Michael Baum, William S. Shimp, Charles L. Bennett, Dinah Faith,
Marc L. Fishman & William J. M. Hrushesky, Interpretation of Surrogate Endpoints in the Era of
the 21st Century Cures Act, 355 BMJ i6286, i6286 (2016); see also William S. Weintraub, Thomas
F. Lüscher & Stuart Pocock, The Perils of Surrogate Endpoints, 36 EUR. HEART J. 2212, 2213 tbl.1
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Commentators have critiqued accelerated pathways, surrogate
endpoints, or both.9 They argue that by adopting these innovations, the
FDA succumbed to external pressures to hasten approval, abandoning
its commitment to scientific rigor.10 Some fear that accelerated
pathways and surrogate endpoints allow the FDA to cut corners,
exposing consumers to riskier drugs and burdening the public with
paying for ineffective medical treatments.11
Concerns regarding industry influence and the FDA’s evidentiary
standards gained national attention in 2021, following the agency’s
controversial approval of the Alzheimer’s drug aducanumab, a process
that relied on surrogate endpoints.12 Experts claim the FDA ignored a
lack of clear evidence for safety and efficacy when it approved
aducanumab against the advice of an expert advisory committee.13
Three respected advisors resigned in protest.14 Some say the agency
reached a new low.15
In addition to substituting surrogate endpoints for direct
observations of product efficacy, the FDA is augmenting and replacing
laboratory and clinical trial data with predictions from computer
models and simulations.16 These technologies increasingly rely on

(2015) (providing a table of potential surrogate endpoints, including biochemical markers
measured in body fluids, radiographic data, physical measurements, and other variables).
9. See, e.g., Knopf et al., supra note 8 (arguing that surrogate endpoints lower the level of
evidence required to rush products to market, which can facilitate opportunistic behavior); see
also Weintraub et al., supra note 8, at 2214 (claiming that surrogate endpoints are often
unreliable).
10. See Jonathan J. Darrow, Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, FDA Approval and
Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 1983-2018, 323 JAMA 164, 173 (2020) (describing pressure from
patients and drug manufacturers to speed FDA approval and to adopt surrogate measures for
efficacy).
11. See, e.g., Knopf et al., supra note 8, at i6288.
12. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, The F.D.A. Has Reached a New Low, N.Y. TIMES
(June 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/15/opinion/alzheimers-drug-aducanumabfda.html [https://perma.cc/3B28-ZPC8].
13. Id.
14. Andrew Joseph, Third Member of FDA Expert Committee Resigns Over Controversial
Alzheimer’s Therapy Decision, STAT (June 10, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/06/10/
third-member-of-fda-expert-committee-resigns-over-controversial-alzheimers-therapy-decision
[https://perma.cc/9MDE-UV2M].
15. Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 12.
16. See Scott Gottlieb, How FDA Plans To Help Consumers Capitalize on Advances in
Science, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-voices/how-fdaplans-help-consumers-capitalize-advances-science [https://perma.cc/TJ5M-8R4R] (last updated
June 28, 2018) (announcing that the FDA uses computer models and simulations “to predict
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artificial intelligence (“AI”) to infer the effects of drugs and medical
devices.17 In 2018, the FDA completed the Virtual Imaging Trial for
Regulatory Evaluation (“VICTRE”), a digital trial that analyzed the
images of 2,986 virtual patients to predict the effectiveness of a new
form of digital breast imaging.18
Modeling and simulation are part of a larger trend in which
administrative agencies automate many facets of their operations. In
the context of public health specifically, AI is changing how the FDA
collects information, performs research, evaluates medical products,
makes policy decisions, and monitors the population for adverse
events.19 In each case, AI impacts the quantity and quality of evidence
on which the FDA relies to make policy and regulatory decisions,
replacing direct evidence with algorithmic predictions.
Existing scholarship concerning AI at the FDA addresses how the
agency should regulate medical devices that make algorithmic
predictions to diagnose and treat patients.20 These products include
modern versions of traditional medical devices, such as pacemakers
and insulin pumps enhanced by AI, as well as new classes of products
that are entirely software-based, such as smartphone apps and clinical
decision support software. Both types of products pose unique risks to
consumers, and the FDA is determining how to best evaluate their
safety and efficacy.21

clinical outcomes, inform clinical trial designs, support evidence of effectiveness, optimize dosing,
predict product safety, and evaluate potential adverse event mechanisms”).
17. See Likhitha Kolla, Fred K. Gruber, Omar Khalid, Colin Hill & Ravi B. Parikh, The
Case for AI-Driven Cancer Clinical Trials – The Efficacy Arm In Silico, 1876 BBA – REVS. ON
CANCER 188572, 188572–74 (2021) (explaining the advantages of adopting AI models for data
analysis over biomathematical models to conduct simulated clinical trials).
18. Id. at 188574.
19. See id.; see also Diksha Sharma, Christian G. Graff, Andreu Badal, Rongping Zeng,
Purva Sawant, Aunnasha Sengupta, Eshan Dahal & Aldo Badano, Technical Note: In Silico
Imaging Tools from the VICTRE Clinical Trial, 46 MED. PHYSICS 3924, 3924 (2019) (describing
the FDA’s use of a computational model to perform a virtual clinical trial to predict the
effectiveness of a new form of diagnostic imaging).
20. See, e.g., Andrea M. Matwyshyn, The Internet of Bodies, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 77,
131 (2019) (recommending that the FDA require extensive premarket disclosures from
companies that produce medical products that utilize AI, including the results of third-party code
audits).
21. See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE
LEARNING (AI/ML)-BASED SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD) ACTION PLAN (2021)
(describing the FDA’s proposed steps for regulating AI-based medical devices in response to
stakeholder input).
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This Article, however, addresses the other side of AI at the FDA.
Instead of serving only as a regulated medical product, AI increasingly
regulates other medical products through its role in computer modeling
and simulation.22 To analyze how these tools are changing FDA
regulation, this Article introduces three nascent technologies:
molecular modeling, virtual humans, and in silico (“simulated”) clinical
trials. These tools use AI to simulate biological phenomena, and like
surrogate endpoints, they allow the FDA to reduce its reliance on
clinical evidence.23 Instead of interpreting data from living research
subjects, the agency may rely on algorithmic predictions drawn from
simulated people and medical products.
Industry and agency representatives praise simulations for
reducing the risk and expense of clinical trials while decreasing the time
required to obtain FDA approval.24 They argue that simulations make
clinical research more efficient, equitable, and inclusive.25 Some claim
the prevailing model for clinical trials, which contributed to the FDA’s
strong reputation during the twentieth century, is burdensome, costly,
and perhaps even outdated.26
Despite their potential benefits, models and simulations have
significant limitations and may pose serious public health risks. Like
surrogate endpoints and accelerated approval pathways, they could

22. See Gottlieb, supra note 16; see also Kolla et al., supra note 17, at 188572 (describing the
role of simulations in evaluating new drugs where computer models and AI might conserve
resources, replace the control and intervention arms of clinical trials, and optimize the
recruitment of research subjects).
23. See, e.g., Biovia, SAOE 2018: Credible Modeling and Simulation at the FDA, YOUTUBE
(July 10, 2018) [hereinafter Biovia], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CRF8JWPaVXU
[https://perma.cc/MVQ6-C25H] (describing the benefits of virtual clinical trials, including
reduced reliance on human trials).
24. See, e.g., Ansys, In Silico Healthcare: The Power To Cure Diseases, To Change the World,
YOUTUBE (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpPx0D0ZTlM [https://perma.cc/
LS4M-JEPW] (arguing that simulation significantly reduces the time and expense of obtaining
FDA approval and that companies adopting virtual clinical trials receive a 500 percent return on
their investment); see also Biovia, supra note 23 (claiming that simulations can reduce the cost of
research and predict the performance of medical products in conditions that would be too
dangerous for human research subjects).
25. See, e.g., Aldo Badano, In Silico Imaging Clinical Trials: Cheaper, Better, Faster, and
More Scalable, 22 TRIALS 1, 1, 4–5 (2021) (stating that simulated imaging trials can be substituted
for clinical trials “at a fraction of the cost,” while supporting similar regulatory decisions); see also
Kolla et al., supra note 17, at 188573 (stating that simulated trials lower the cost of research by
shortening its duration, eliminating costs associated with recruiting patients, and reducing the
physical resources required).
26. See, e.g., Kolla et al., supra note 17, at 188572.
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erode the FDA’s evidentiary standards and expose the public to
dangerous and unreliable products.27 They may also camouflage
industry influence over the regulatory process.28 Yet agency and
industry reports usually exclude these potential harms.29 Moreover,
academic scholarship on AI has largely overlooked its role in FDA
computer models and simulations.30
This Article helps fill the gap in AI research by analyzing the
ethical, legal, and social implications of relying on models and
simulations in the context of public health regulation. Without careful
consideration of the risks and the implementation of appropriate
safeguards, automating FDA regulation could harm consumers,
exacerbate existing inequality, erode public trust, and undermine
agency accountability and legitimacy.
This Article contains four Parts. Part I summarizes FDA history,
including how the agency’s authority and reputation have changed over
time. It describes the FDA’s increasing reliance on premarket clinical
evidence in the mid-twentieth century, its shift away from clinical data
by the turn of the century, and its increasing emphasis on postmarket
surveillance in the early twenty-first century. Part I concludes by
analyzing how political and industry influence—and a series of
questionable decisions—have eroded public trust in the FDA.
Part II evaluates the FDA’s existing and future uses for AI by
introducing three nascent modeling and simulation technologies. It
explains how they streamline agency functions, hasten the shift away

27. See, e.g., Knopf et al., supra note 8, at i6288 (describing the risks of relying on surrogate
endpoints).
28. See id. at i6286 (explaining how stakeholders may exploit the use of surrogate endpoints,
and other means of subverting fundamental principles of randomized trials, for personal gain
while rushing therapies to market).
29. See, e.g., Christopher R. Ellis, Rebecca Racz, Naomi L. Kruhlak, Marlene T. Kim,
Alexey V. Zakharov, Noel Southall, Edward G. Hawkins, Keith Burkhart, David G. Strauss &
Lidiya Stavitskaya, Evaluating Kratom Alkaloids Using PHASE, 15 PLOS ONE e0229646,
e0229646 (2020) (omitting discussion of the public health risks associated with biased or
inaccurate predictions).
30. For two examples that have addressed the role of AI in FDA models and simulations,
see DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM, DANIEL E. HO, CATHERINE M. SHARKEY & MARIANOFLORENTINO CUÉLLAR, GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 53 (2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S6Q-XC3S] (discussing
attempts to use AI to analyze reports in the FDA Adverse Event Reporting System, which the
FDA concluded were unsuccessful) and David W. Opderbeck, Artificial Intelligence in
Pharmaceuticals, Biologics, and Medical Devices: Present and Future Regulatory Models, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 553, 570–71 (2019) (introducing the FDA’s perspective on in silico trials).

MARKS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1214

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/24/2022 11:31 AM

[Vol. 71:1207

from clinical evidence, and transform AI from a regulated medical
product to a regulator of other medical products. This Part draws upon
the fields of AI ethics and data protection regulation to analyze the
risks and benefits of these technologies, including their impact on
patient safety, research equity, medical innovation, and public health.
Part III analyzes how administrative law doctrine might apply to
FDA modeling and simulation. It evaluates the impact of these
technologies on agency transparency, accountability, and legitimacy,
while evaluating the limits of administrative law to effectively address
the effects. It concludes that in some cases, automating FDA regulation
could undermine historical justifications for delegating congressional
authority to agencies and erode the FDA’s credibility.
Part IV analyzes agency guidance documents and proposals for
good simulation practices. It concludes that administrative law and the
FDA should adopt principles of AI ethics and offers recommendations
for safer and more equitable automation of public health regulation.
I. FROM SNAKE OIL TO SURROGATES: THE RISE AND FALL OF
CLINICAL EVIDENCE
To contextualize the FDA’s adoption of computer models and
simulations, this Part summarizes the agency’s history and how its
treatment of evidence has changed over time. The FDA is a public
health agency housed within the Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”), and its effects on the economy and public safety are
substantial.31 FDA-regulated products account for approximately 20
percent of U.S. household spending, equaling over $2.5 trillion.32
However, the agency had far more humble beginnings. In the early
twentieth century, its predecessor, the Bureau of Chemistry, provided

31. See FDA Organization Charts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/fda-organization/fda-organization-charts [https://perma.cc/2GX5-6ZVY] (last updated Mar.
21, 2019) (depicting the organizational hierarchy of the FDA’s nine different center-level
organizations); see also ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 30, at 54 (describing the FDA’s impact on
the U.S. economy).
32. ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 30, at 54.
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only limited protection from harmful products.33 The Bureau required
no testing for product safety or efficacy.34
In 1906, Congress enacted the Pure Food and Drugs Act in
response to widespread drug contamination and adulteration.35 The act
required accurate labeling to prevent false or misleading claims
regarding a drug’s identity and composition.36 However, the law did not
prohibit false therapeutic claims.37
In 1927, the Bureau split into two new agencies, and regulatory
functions were moved to the newly formed Food, Drug, and Insecticide
Administration.38 In 1938, after the agency’s name was shortened to the
Food and Drug Administration,39 Congress increased its power by
enacting the FDCA, which empowered the agency to require evidence
of safety before drugs could be marketed.40 Despite this advancement,
the FDCA had shortcomings. If the FDA did not act on a new drug
application within sixty days, the drug was automatically approved.41
In 1959, following the high-profile thalidomide scandal, in which a
drug sold for treating morning sickness in pregnant women caused
birth defects in thousands of babies, Senator Estes Kefauver held
hearings to improve the FDCA.42 The resulting Kefauver-Harris Drug
Amendments required manufacturers to provide evidence of safety
and efficacy before drugs could be marketed.43 Evidence was obtained

33. See Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug Law, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. [hereinafter
Milestones], https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-history/milestones-us-food-and-drug-law
[https://perma.cc/CS8T-E4DP] (last updated Jan. 31, 2018).
34. See id. (noting that evidence of safety was not required until 1938 and testing for efficacy
was not required until 1962).
35. Id.
36. United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 497 (1911).
37. See id.
38. Wallace F. Janssen, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels, FDA CONSUMER MAG.,
June 1981, https://lessonbank.kyae.ky.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/The-Story-of-the-LawsBehind-the-Labels.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQS3-ZYMY]; see also Milestones, supra note 33
(describing how nonregulatory research was shifted to the newly formed Bureau of Chemistry
and Soils).
39. Janssen, supra note 38.
40. See CARPENTER, supra note 1.
41. TOM BRODY, CLINICAL TRIALS 782 (2d ed. 2016).
42. Id. at 783 (describing enactment of the Kefauver-Harris Amendments); see also
Frederick Dove, What’s Happened to Thalidomide Babies, BBC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2011),
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-15536544 [https://perma.cc/KL4C-KEWY] (describing the
harmful effects of thalidomide).
43. Greene & Podolsky, supra note 3.
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from “adequate and well-controlled investigations.”44 Modern threephased randomized controlled trials meet this standard.
In clinical research, Phase 1 trials evaluate the safety of new
medical products in small numbers of healthy volunteers.45 Drug
manufacturers must submit an Investigational New Drug application
before commencing a Phase 1 trial.46 This stage typically includes
twenty to one hundred participants and can last several months.47
Phase 2 trials add more participants, last longer, and evaluate
effectiveness in addition to safety.48 They include several hundred
participants with specific medical conditions and last from several
months to two years.49
Phase 3 trials are the final stage before evidence is submitted to
the FDA for review and approval.50 Like Phase 2 trials, they evaluate
both safety and efficacy in people with specific health conditions.51
However, Phase 3 trials are much larger, consisting of a few hundred
to a few thousand participants, and they last from one to four years.52
After completing Phase 3 trials, drug makers must submit a New Drug
Application before the FDA will consider their products for approval,
which allows drugs to be marketed in the United States.53
Phase 4 is a more recent innovation that consists of postmarket
surveillance in which manufacturers monitor public use of their
FDA-approved products.54 Postmarket surveillance has been criticized
because manufacturers often fail to follow through with it, and

44. Drug Amendments of 1962 § 102, 21 U.S.C. § 355(d); see also Greene & Podolsky, supra
note 3, at 1482.
45. Step 3: Clinical Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2018) [hereinafter
Clinical Research], https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-process/step-3-clinicalresearch [https://perma.cc/4MGV-T2MG].
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. [hereinafter NDA],
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/new-drug-application-nda [https://perma.cc/E4H7TDDV] (last updated June 10, 2019).
51. Clinical Research, supra note 45.
52. Id.
53. NDA, supra note 50.
54. See Daniel Carpenter, Reputation, Gatekeeping and the Politics of Post-Marketing Drug
Regulation, 8 ETHICS J. AM. MED. ASS’N 403, 404 (2006).
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compliance can be difficult to monitor and enforce.55 Despite these
shortcomings, in recent years, Congress and the FDA have pushed for
increasing reliance on postmarket surveillance, which was codified in
the 21st Century Cures Act.56
In addition to being lengthy and expensive, clinical trials can also
expose people to physical and psychological risks.57 Participants can be
harmed by unproven interventions, or, if placed in a control group,
they can receive placebos instead of the experimental treatment they
had hoped to receive.58 Due to the length and expense of randomized
controlled trials, patient advocacy groups and industry stakeholders
pressured the FDA to accelerate the process by creating exceptions to
its standard practices.59
Calls for faster FDA approval prompted the creation of four
accelerated pathways, including priority review, accelerated approval,
fast track designation, and breakthrough therapy designation. 60 The
first path, priority review, speeds up FDA review of completed trial
data.61 The latter three pathways reduce the mean time to FDA
approval by several years, in part by allowing the substitution of
surrogate endpoints for clinical evidence.62

55. See id. (reporting that many postmarketing commitments are not honored, in part
because the FDA has more power over sponsors during the premarket period).
56. See, e.g., Deborah Mazer & Gregory D. Curfman, 21st Century Cures Act Lowers
Confidence in FDA Approved Drugs and Devices, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Feb. 14, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170214.058710/full [https://perma.cc/QY3VG837] (criticizing the 21st Century Cures Act for expanding the use of postmarket surveillance
data).
57. See, e.g., Charles Schmidt, The Struggle To Do No Harm, 552 NATURE S74, S74 (2017)
(describing unexplained deaths that have occurred during cancer therapy trials).
58. See id.; see also S. Ito, Placebo in Clinical Trials, 90 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 637, 637 (2011) (defining placebos and describing their use in clinical trials).
59. See Darrow, Avorn & Kesselheim, supra note 10, at 173; see also Christopher H.
Foreman, Jr., The Fast Track: Federal Agencies and the Political Demand for AIDS Drugs, 9
BROOKINGS REV. 30, 31–32 (1991) (describing the impact of AIDS activism on FDA approval
timelines).
60. See Darrow, Avorn & Kesselheim, supra note 10, at 169.
61. Priority Review, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/
patients/fast-track-breakthrough-therapy-accelerated-approval-priority-review/priority-review
[https://perma.cc/4T2J-XH3L] (explaining that priority review indicates the FDA’s intent to
review a new drug application within six months, compared to the usual review period of ten
months).
62. Darrow, Avorn & Kesselheim, New FDA Breakthrough-Drug Category, supra note 6,
at 1253–55.
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Some experts criticize the FDA’s increasing reliance on
accelerated pathways, arguing it erodes evidentiary standards.63 While
approving the Gardasil vaccine for cervical cancer through its fast track
pathway, for example, the FDA accepted surrogate endpoints in lieu
of direct evidence.64 Critics claimed the surrogates were of little value
in determining the vaccine’s long-term effectiveness for cancer
prevention.65
Further, some experts believe the shift away from direct evidence
of clinical improvement has occurred because the agency grew too
close to the industries it regulates.66 When the FDA approved
aducanumab based on surrogate endpoints, it went against the advice
of an expert advisory committee.67 Three members of the committee
resigned.68 One of them, Dr. Aaron Kesselheim, described the decision
as “probably the worst drug approval decision in recent US history.”69
Kesselheim said the agency and representatives of drug sponsor
Biogen seemed unusually aligned in support of approving
aducanumab.70 Daniel Carpenter, professor of government at Harvard
University, concluded, “We’re seeing what happens when the FDA
loses credibility.”71
Automating FDA regulation through the substitution of models
and simulations for clinical evidence may further erode the FDA’s
evidentiary standards and undermine agency credibility. Part II
describes how these tools currently influence the FDA’s research and
regulatory decisions.

63. Id. at 1255; Darrow, Avorn & Kesselheim, supra note 10, at 173.
64. See Lucija Tomljenovic & Christopher A. Shaw, Too Fast or Not Too Fast: The FDA’s
Approval of Merck’s HPV Vaccine Gardasil, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 673, 674–75 (2012).
65. Id. at 675.
66. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Road to Aduhelm: What One Ex-FDA Advisor Called ‘Probably
the Worst Drug Approval Decision in Recent US History’ for an Alzheimer’s Treatment, CNN
(Sept. 27, 2021, 10:01 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/26/politics/alzheimers-drug-aduhelmfda-approval/index.html [https://perma.cc/9P89-DNSV] (describing how the FDA overruled its
expert advisory committee).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Daniel Carpenter, We’re Seeing What Happens When the FDA Loses Credibility, WASH.
POST (July 21, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/21/were-seeingwhat-happens-when-fda-loses-credibility [https://perma.cc/2BA9-9BTJ].
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II. BUILDING AN ALGORITHMIC FDA
This Part introduces three technologies used by the FDA to
simulate biological systems in the interest of supporting research and
regulatory decision-making. Molecular modeling, virtual humans, and
simulated clinical trials are part of a larger trend in which sixty-four
agencies have adopted, or plan to adopt, AI systems to automate a
variety of governance tasks.72 The following discussion summarizes this
phenomenon.
A. Automating the Administrative State
AI has captured the imagination of the media, the public, and
industries from Wall Street to Silicon Valley.73 Federal agencies are
also experimenting with AI to automate their operations.74 According
to a 2020 report drafted for the Administrative Conference of the
United States (“ACUS”), the maturation of AI technology, and its
adoption by federal agencies, may be one of the most important
developments for the administrative state in decades.75
The ACUS report canvassed 142 federal departments and
agencies to determine which had adopted AI tools.76 It concluded that
45 percent of the organizations studied had experimented with AI.77
The authors identified 157 use cases across sixty-four agencies.78 The
Office of Justice Programs had the most use cases with a total of 12.79
The Securities and Exchange Commission had the second-highest
72.
73.

ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 30, at 16.
See, e.g., FRANCESCO MARCONI, NEWSMAKERS: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE
FUTURE OF JOURNALISM 20 (2020) (describing journalism of the future in which human reporters
collaborate with AI); George Dvorsky, How an Artificial Superintelligence Might Actually
Destroy Humanity, GIZMODO (May 26, 2021, 10:20 AM), https://gizmodo.com/how-an-artificialsuperintelligence-might-actually-dest-1846968207 [https://perma.cc/2XYD-FTXA] (arguing that
AI poses an existential threat to humanity); see also Steve Taplin, How AI Is Connecting
Employers with Software Engineers, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 10, 2021), https://
www.entrepreneur.com/article/396480 [https://perma.cc/LSD6-SHN2] (describing how employers
increasingly use AI to recruit top talent). See generally Mason Marks, Artificial Intelligence Based
Suicide Prediction, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 98 (2019) (describing how social media companies use
AI to predict which users have mental health conditions and who is most likely to attempt
suicide).
74. ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 30, at 6.
75. Id. at 9.
76. Id. at 6.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 16.
79. Id. at 16 tbl.2.
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number of cases with 10, and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration had 9.80 With 8 use cases, the FDA tied with two other
agencies, the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S. Postal Service, for
the fourth-highest number of cases.81 Four other agencies, the Social
Security Administration, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”), the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, each had between 4 and 7 use cases.82
Agencies are adopting AI across diverse policy areas to assist with
many government functions, including adjudication, enforcement,
public engagement, internal management, and regulatory research,
analysis, and monitoring.83 For instance, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
uses AI to sort injury narratives submitted by workers, the Securities
and Exchange Commission uses AI to identify people most at risk of
violating securities regulations, and the PTO uses AI to help adjudicate
patent applications.84
The ACUS report also indicated that law enforcement was the
policy area most likely to receive AI support, with over 30 use cases,
and education was the least likely with fewer than 5.85 Health was the
second most automated area with nearly 20 use cases, almost half as
many as law enforcement.86 Financial regulation, social welfare,
commerce, and environmental regulation followed close behind with
between 10 and 15 use cases each.87
Regulatory research, analysis, and monitoring were the most
frequently automated governance tasks with about 80 uses.88 This
category includes AI tools that help agencies collect and analyze data
to aid policymaking.89 Adjudication had the fewest use cases with
approximately 12.90 Adjudication includes AI tools that assist formal
or informal adjudication of rights and benefits.91

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10 tbl.1.
Id.
Id. at 17 fig.1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17 fig.2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Only one third of use cases had been fully deployed by agencies.92
Just over 40 had been partially deployed or were restricted to pilot
programs, and the majority of uses, about 60, remained in the planning
stages.93 Over half of the AI systems, representing about 84 cases, had
been created in-house by agency staff.94 Nearly 50 were developed
externally by commercial contractors, and about 20 were produced
through noncommercial collaborations between agencies and
academic labs or through public-facing competitions.95 The
implications of who develops agency AI systems and what kind of data
they analyze will be discussed further below.
Most use cases, about 80 of 157, analyzed structured data
consisting of numerical information.96 The remaining cases analyzed
unstructured data, which consisted of text in about 70 cases, images in
approximately 40 cases, and audio in about 5 cases.97
Arguably, some federal agencies can automate many operations
without endangering the public.98 However, because the FDA creates
and enforces public health policies and regulates numerous medical
products across diverse industries, automating its operations could
profoundly impact the health of millions.99 Moreover, because the
agency strongly influences international policy, the impact is
potentially global.100 The following section introduces three nascent AI
technologies that the FDA uses to automate a variety of governance
tasks.
B. FDA Modeling and Simulation
Computer modeling uses software, mathematics, and physics to
create abstract representations of complex systems and study their
92. Id. at 18.
93. Id. at 18 fig.3.
94. Id. at 18 fig.4.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 19 fig.6.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision
Making in the Machine Learning Era, GEO. L.J. 1147, 1169 (2017) (arguing that automated mail
sorting by the U.S. Postal Service poses little social or legal risk).
99. See What Does FDA Regulate?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
about-fda/fda-basics/what-does-fda-regulate [https://perma.cc/5LC3-Y6YD] (last updated June
24, 2021).
100. See CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 687 (describing the strong international influence of
FDA policies).
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behavior.101 Models are built to represent many complex systems
including molecules, aircraft, weather systems, and earthquakes. They
are particularly useful for solving problems associated with systems for
which there are no easier means of analysis.102
Each model contains variables that collectively approximate the
corresponding system.103 Simulation of various conditions can be
achieved by adjusting one or more variables and observing the
results.104 Connecting different models allows researchers to simulate
more complex phenomena. For instance, a model of the solar system
might contain other models that represent the planets, and each
planetary model might contain models for an atmosphere and its
weather. The term “multiscale modeling” describes the process of
combining models representing phenomena at different scales.105
Combining models at the tissue, organ, and organismal levels, for
example, enables simulation of disease processes and the effects of
therapeutic intervention.106
The FDA ranks computer modeling and simulation among its core
strategic priorities.107 The agency aims to reduce its reliance on clinical
trials by replacing them with simulated trials, in which products are
tested on populations of virtual patients comprising multiscale models
representing different physiologic processes.108 According to Dr. Tina
Morrison, director of the Office of Regulatory Science and Innovation
101. See Computational Modeling, NAT’L INST. OF BIOMEDICAL IMAGING &
BIOENGINEERING, https://www.nibib.nih.gov/science-education/science-topics/computationalmodeling [https://perma.cc/JXP7-8GXX] (last updated May 2020); see also William A. Menner,
Introduction to Modeling and Simulation, 16 JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECH. DIG. 6, 6 (1995)
(defining a “model” as an abstraction of a system).
102. Menner, supra note 101.
103. Computational Modeling, supra note 101.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Credibility of Computational Models Program: Research on Computational Models
and Simulation Associated with Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. [hereinafter
Credibility of Computational Models Program], https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/medicaldevice-regulatory-science-research-programs-conducted-osel/credibility-computational-modelsprogram-research-computational-models-and-simulation-associated [https://perma.cc/LE65G9Q8] (last updated Mar. 24, 2021); see also Tina M. Morrison, Prasanna Hariharan, Chloe M.
Funkhouser, Payman Afshari, Mark Goodin & Marc Horner, Assessing Computational Model
Credibility Using a Risk-Based Framework: Application to Hemolysis in Centrifugal Blood Pumps,
65 ASAIO J. 349, 349 (2019) (“Computational modeling continues to be a top regulatory science
priority for CDRH for medical device evaluation.”).
108. Credibility of Computational Models Program, supra note 107.
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at the FDA, “[R]ealistically, modeling and simulation does not play a
driving role in regulatory decision making. But we want it to.”109
Alluding to the FDA’s shift away from premarket data, Morrison
added, “We want to lessen the burden of evidence from clinical and
animal studies. We want to do the work that’s necessary, and not the
work we think is needed just because that’s what we’ve done for twenty
years.”110 However, despite the promise of computer models,
regulators acknowledge that their credibility is not well established.111
Moreover, adopting models hastily or haphazardly can produce
erroneous conclusions.112
Credibility reflects a model’s ability to elicit trust in its predictions
for a specific context of use.113 According to FDA guidance, many
existing and proposed algorithmic models have not been rigorously
evaluated, and their credibility is unknown.114 Others have known
deficiencies that negatively affect their credibility.115
The FDA identifies several major gaps and challenges of
establishing model credibility.116 There is a paucity of quality clinical
and experimental data to develop and validate models and simulations,
especially information derived from humans under real-world
conditions, that includes data from sufficiently diverse populations.117
There is also a lack of validation tools and metrics, and there are no
reliable methods to evaluate the acceptability of virtual patients in a
cohort.118 Moreover, there are no tools to reliably verify relevant
computer code and calculations, and decision-making frameworks for
evaluating the overall credibility of models and simulations remain
rudimentary.119

109. Biovia, supra note 23, at 16:44.
110. Id. at 16:50.
111. Credibility of Computational Models Program, supra note 107.
112. Menner, supra note 101.
113. Carl Popelar, Tina Morrison, Andrew Rau & Ryan Crane, V&V for Computational
Modeling for Medical Devices, ASME, https://www.imagwiki.nibib.nih.gov/sites/default/
files/asme_vv_40_model_simulation_standard.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y249-45RE].
114. Credibility of Computational Models Program, supra note 107.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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Importantly, there are also no established best practices for using
models and simulations or relying on them to make regulatory
decisions.120 To address these concerns, the FDA’s Center for Devices
and Radiologic Health (“CDRH”) created an initiative called the
Credibility of Computational Models Program, which is one of twenty
research initiatives within the FDA’s Office of Science and
Engineering Laboratories.121
When FDA officials and industry stakeholders discuss the
shortcomings of computer models and simulations, their descriptions
often include vague concepts such as trust and credibility, while
omitting specifics regarding the risks of substituting algorithmic models
for FDA staff judgment and how to mitigate those risks.122 One
frequently overlooked concern is how algorithmic bias becomes baked
into machine learning models.
Machine learning is a form of AI that excels at pattern
recognition.123 It analyzes large data sets and discovers correlations that
are imperceptible to humans.124 Before deploying machine learning
models, programmers must train them on historical data.125 The
correlations derived from training data can then be deployed as rules
to make predictions from a new data set. In this manner, the outputs of
machine learning models are shaped by the examples to which they are
exposed during training, and biased sets of training data produce
biased models and predictions.126 For instance, training predictive
models on data sets that underrepresent certain populations can
produce predictions that are inaccurate for those groups.127 Moreover,
training data that reflects prejudices directed at certain communities

120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See generally Ellis et al., supra note 29 (describing the FDA’s use of computer models
and artificial intelligence to predict how substances affect the body and impact public health).
123. David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn
About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 671 (2017).
124. See Mason Marks, Emergent Medical Data: Health Information Inferred by Artificial
Intelligence, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 995, 1005–06 (2021).
125. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
671, 678 (2016).
126. See id. at 680–81.
127. See Effy Vayena, Alessandro Blasimme & I. Glenn Cohen, Machine Learning in
Medicine: Addressing Ethical Challenges, 15 PLOS MED. e1002689, e1002690 (2018) (describing
how an algorithm trained largely on data from a population of older white men would yield
inaccurate predictions for younger Black women).
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often produces models that retain those prejudices, and their biased
outputs may disproportionately impact certain groups.128 In one
example, a machine learning model concluded that Black patients were
healthier than they actually were.129 The algorithm made this error
because it used healthcare costs as a proxy for medical need; because
less money was spent on Black patients compared to white patients of
comparable health, the algorithm incorrectly concluded that the Black
patients were healthier than their white counterparts.130 In this case, an
existing bias in healthcare spending was incorporated into the
algorithm and caused a false conclusion.131 If relied on to direct
healthcare resources, the algorithm could have incorrectly directed
those resources away from Black patients.
Not every computer model uses machine learning. Some use wellknown mathematical relationships and physical principles to predict
outcomes.132 Because the models rely on known equations that are not
derived from training data, the outputs of these physics-based models
may be more explainable than data-driven machine learning algorithms
that create their own rules by analyzing large data sets. Some machine
learning algorithms, called white box models, are more explainable
than others because they rely on established patterns, rules, or decision
trees.133 Other models, called black boxes, can be difficult to
understand and explain, even by experts in the relevant field.134 In
practice the line between white and black box machine learning models
is not always clear, and some models called grey boxes are hybrids of

128. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 125, at 681.
129. See Kerstin N. Vokinger, Stefan Feuerriegel & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Mitigating Bias in
Machine Learning for Medicine, COMMC’NS MED., Aug. 23, 2021, at 1, 1.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Hector Klie, A Tale of Two Approaches: Physics-Based vs. Data-Driven Models, J.
PETROL. TECH. (May 3, 2021), https://jpt.spe.org/a-tale-of-two-approaches-physics-based-vsdata-driven-models [https://perma.cc/NZP7-JLCP].
133. See Octavio Loyola-González, Black-Box vs. White-Box: Understanding Their
Advantages and Weaknesses from a Practical Point of View, 7 IEEE ACCESS 154096, 154096
(2019) (defining white box models).
134. Id. at 154097.
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the two.135 Combining elements of physics-based and data-driven
models can improve predictions to help solve real-world problems.136
Biased predictions can occur in the absence of nefarious intent
because bias can creep into algorithmic models at many stages.137
Researchers can introduce bias while selecting training data, when
processing and labeling the data to make it more easily readable by
computers, while selecting models for a task, or when interpreting
algorithmic predictions.138 A detailed description of these steps is
beyond the scope of this Article, and other authors provide
comprehensive explanations of this topic.139 Suffice to say, accounting
for bias in computer models and simulations is complex and
challenging.
One might assume that as a scientific agency, the FDA’s models
are less susceptible to bias than algorithms used in other contexts such
as employment screening, policing, and criminal sentencing. Unlike
predictive models used in those contexts, which directly impact
individuals, the FDA’s predictions often affect healthcare products,
medical research, and the rights of manufacturers. Because algorithmic
bias impacts people less directly in the public health context, it may be
less obvious. However, because the FDA regulates thousands of
products across numerous industries that affect the health and safety
of millions, this algorithmic bias is no less harmful.140
The following discussions analyze the current and potential roles
of three modeling technologies in FDA regulation. Like surrogate
endpoints, the outputs of these technologies serve as indirect evidence
of product safety and efficacy. Despite acknowledging that they lack
credibility, the FDA increasingly relies on them to shape its policies.

135. See Emmanuel Pintelas, Ioannis E. Livieris & Panagiotis Pintelas, A Grey-Box
Ensemble Model Exploiting Black-Box Accuracy and White-Box Intrinsic Interpretability, 13
ALGORITHMS 17, 18 (2020).
136. Klie, supra note 132.
137. See id. at 674, 681–93.
138. Id. at 681–93; see also Lehr & Ohm, supra note 123, at 653–54 (listing the stages of
machine learning).
139. See generally Lehr & Ohm, supra note 123 (describing the steps in the machine learning
process).
140. See Fact Sheet: FDA at a Glance, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/media/154548/download [https://perma.cc/JD75-V36T] (last updated Nov.
2021) (stating that the FDA oversees more than $2.7 trillion in food, medical product, and tobacco
consumption, including about 78 percent of the U.S. food supply, over 20,000 prescription drugs,
over 6,700 medical devices, and over 100,000 tobacco products).
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1. Molecular Models. In 2018, FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb
issued a statement regarding kratom, a botanical product derived from
the tree Mitragyna speciosa that acts as a pain reliever and mild
stimulant.141 In Southeast Asia, many chew its leaves to remain alert,
much like others drink caffeinated beverages to boost concentration.142
Some use kratom to relieve pain or as a substitute for opium and other
opioids.143 In his statement, Gottlieb claimed kratom’s most common
active ingredients, including mitragynine and 7-hydroxymitragynine,
collectively referred to as the mitragynines, are harmful opioids that
pose serious risks to humans.144
The FDA had previously discouraged kratom use.145 However,
Gottlieb’s announcement was surprising because he unveiled a
computational methodology called Public Health Assessment via
Structural Evaluation (“PHASE”).146 When the FDA identifies a
potentially harmful substance, it now uses PHASE to assess the risk to
public safety.147

141. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Statement from FDA Commissioner
Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on the Agency’s Scientific Evidence on the Presence of Opioid Compounds
in Kratom, Underscoring Its Potential for Abuse (Feb. 6, 2018) [hereinafter Gottlieb 2018],
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-scott-gottliebmd-agencys-scientific-evidence-presence-opioid-compounds [https://perma.cc/UG9J-BLNH].
142. See, e.g., Darshan Singh, Suresh Narayanan, Balasingam Vicknasingam, Ornella
Corazza, Rita Santacroce & Andres Roman Urrestarazu, Changing Trends in the Use of Kratom
(Mitragyna Speciosa) in Southeast Asia, 32 HUM. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY (SPECIAL ISSUE)
e2582, e2583 (2017) (stating that in Southeast Asia, many individuals consume kratom in the
morning to combat fatigue and increase productivity).
143. Id.
144. Gottlieb 2018, supra note 141.
145. Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Remarks at the FDA Office of
Criminal Investigations Meeting (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/speeches-fdaofficials/remarks-fda-office-criminal-investigations-meeting-11142017 [https://perma.cc/P9RVN4EG] (describing the FDA’s use of its PHASE methodology to predict the physical effects and
public health impact of the twenty-five most common compounds in kratom); see also Ellis et al.,
supra note 29, at 2–3 (describing mitragynine and 7-hydroxymitagynine as compounds that bind
to the μ-opioid receptor and comprise a significant portion of the alkaloids found in kratom).
146. See Gottlieb 2018, supra note 141; Christopher R. Ellis, Rebecca Racz, Naomi L.
Kruhlak, Marlene T. Kim, Edward G. Hawkins, David G. Strauss & Lidiya Stavitskaya, Assessing
the Structural and Pharmacological Similarity of Newly Identified Drugs of Abuse to Controlled
Substances Using Public Health Assessment via Structural Evaluation, 106 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 116, 116 (2019) [hereinafter Ellis et al., Assessing the
Structural and Pharmacological Similarity of Newly Identified Drugs].
147. See Ellis et al., Assessing the Structural and Pharmacological Similarity of Newly
Identified Drugs, supra note 146, at 117.
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When announcing PHASE, Gottlieb concluded that kratom posed
an imminent risk to public health.148 He claimed the FDA’s models
predicted that the mitragynines bind strongly to the μ-opioid receptor,
which also binds opioids like morphine and heroin.149 However,
Gottlieb revealed few details on how PHASE works, beyond
describing its underlying models as “an advanced, common and
reliable tool for understanding the behavior of drugs in the body.”150
FDA scientists later revealed that PHASE relies on “machine learning
techniques, such as random forest, support vector machine, and
artificial neural networks.”151
Figure 1: FDA Kratom model illustration

Some experts criticized the FDA’s use of PHASE to predict
kratom’s potential for harm.152 According to Andrew Kruegel, a
research chemist at Columbia University, the FDA’s claim that kratom
has risks comparable to those of morphine is like saying that all
molecules that bind to the μ-opioid receptor have the same effects,
148. See Gottlieb 2018, supra note 141.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Ellis et al., Assessing the Structural and Pharmacological Similarity of Newly
Identified Drugs, supra note 146, at 118.
152. See, e.g., Nick Wing, FDA Releases Kratom Death Data, Undermines Its Own Claims
About Drug’s Deadly Harms, HUFFPOST (Feb. 7, 2018, 11:20 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/kratom-deaths-fda_n_5a7a3549e4b07af4e81eda8b [https://perma.cc/37EX-QEUW] (reporting
that the FDA’s analysis of kratom was far less rigorous than previous studies).
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“which is not true based on what we’ve learned about these
compounds.”153 Numerous factors determine a drug’s effects and
potential for harm, including how it is absorbed, how easily it crosses
the blood-brain barrier, how its binding to cell surface receptors affects
the interior of cells, and how quickly it is metabolized and excreted.154
Some of these variables are represented by the phrase absorption,
distribution, metabolism, and excretion (“ADME”).
In particular, through a phenomenon called biased agonism, the
mitragynines produce intracellular effects that differ from those
triggered by classic opioids.155 Specifically, they fail to activate an
intracellular protein called -arrestin 2, which triggers a cascade of
intracellular events that are linked to the potentially fatal effects of
opioids, such as slow and shallow breathing.156 Biased agonism and
ADME are more difficult to model than chemical structure and
binding affinity due to their complexity.157 The PHASE methodology
did not account for these factors, and Gottlieb omitted its limitations
from his public statements.158 Thus, concerns about accuracy and
reliability are warranted.
Police sometimes use smart technologies, such as AI- and internetenabled cameras and microphones, to predict who will commit crimes
based on similarities between one’s appearance or behavior and those

153. Id.
154. See Josh Bloom, The FDA Concludes That Kratom Is an Opioid, And . . ., AM. COUNCIL
SCI. HEALTH (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.acsh.org/news/2018/02/06/fda-concludes-kratom-opioidand-12537 [https://perma.cc/Y9VG-YCE6] (explaining that absorption, metabolism, and ease of
traversing the blood-brain barrier influence drug effects and are more difficult to predict than is
binding affinity); see also Andrew C. Kruegel, Madalee M. Gassaway, Abhijeet Kapoor, Andras
Varadi, Susruta Majumdar, Marta Filizola, Jonathan A. Javitch & Dalibor Sames, Synthetic and
Receptor Signaling Explorations of the Mitragyna Alkaloids: Mitragynine as an Atypical Molecular
Framework for Opioid Receptor Modulators, 138 J. AM. CHEM. SOC’Y 6754, 6757 (2016)
(explaining how biased agonism allows substances to produce different intracellular effects when
binding to the same cell surface receptor).
155. See Kruegel et al., supra note 154.
156. See id.; C. E. Groer, K. Tidgewell, R. A. Moyer, W. W. Harding, R. B. Rothman, T. E.
Prisinzano & L. M. Bohn, An Opioid Receptor Agonist that Does Not Induce μ-Opioid Receptor
– Arrestin Interactions or Receptor Internalization, 71 MOLECULAR PHARMACOLOGY 549, 555
(2007); see also Iris Bachmutsky, Xin Paul Wei, Eszter Kish & Kevin Yackle, Opioids Depress
Breathing Through Two Small Brainstem Sites, 9 ELIFE e52694, e52694 (2020).
157. See Bloom, supra note 154; see also Ellis et al., Assessing the Structural and
Pharmacological Similarity of Newly Identified Drugs, supra note 146, at 121 (stating that PHASE
does not consider lipid solubility, blood-brain barrier transmission, and drug clearance).
158. See Gottlieb 2018, supra note 141.

MARKS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1230

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/24/2022 11:31 AM

[Vol. 71:1207

of people known to have committed crimes in the past.159 Similarly, the
FDA uses molecular modeling to predict the effects of substances
based on their chemical structure and predicted binding affinities, and
their similarities to substances known to cause harm.160 However, facial
features and behavior are not reliable predictors of future acts,161 and
similarly, due to phenomena like biased agonism, chemical structure
and binding affinity are unreliable predictors of drug effects.162
Typically, FDA officials and industry stakeholders justify the use
of computer models and simulations on the ground that they reduce
the burden on drug companies and agency staff when developing and
evaluating substances and medical products.163 In the case of kratom
and other unregulated substances, the FDA justifies using PHASE on
slightly different grounds. Instead of reducing the burden on
manufacturers and agency staff during the approval process, FDA
scientists claim PHASE reduces their burden when evaluating
substances for potential regulation or prohibition by U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”).164
Before the DEA can place a drug on the controlled substances list,
a process called scheduling, the FDA performs a scientific analysis
based on eight factors defined by the Controlled Substances Act
(“CSA”).165 FDA scientists claim that using PHASE as a substitute for
the eight-factor analysis of unknown substances, such as suspected

159. See Ángel Díaz, Data-Driven Policing’s Threat to Our Constitutional Rights,
BROOKINGS (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/data-driven-policingsthreat-to-our-constitutional-rights [https://perma.cc/7WJY-4FZS]; see also Doug Wyllie, How AI
Software Could Monitor Real-Time Camera Feeds To Detect Criminal Behavior, POLICE1 (Dec.
7, 2017), https://www.police1.com/police-products/intelligence-led-policing/articles/how-aisoftware-could-monitor-real-time-camera-feeds-to-detect-criminal-behavior-NW2h8yWh6Cv
LxPCP [https://perma.cc/4HPE-Z7AS].
160. See generally Ellis et al., Assessing the Structural and Pharmacological Similarity of
Newly Identified Drugs, supra note 146 (noting PHASE uses molecular structure to predict
biological function and to compare similarities between controlled substances and newly
emerging illicit drugs).
161. See Diaz, supra note 159 (stating predictive policing technologies are often biased and
inaccurate).
162. See Bloom, supra note 154; Kruegel et al., supra note 154.
163. See, e.g., Ellis et al., Assessing the Structural and Pharmacological Similarity of Newly
Identified Drugs, supra note 146, at 117 (stating that the FDA developed molecular modeling to
save time when evaluating newly identified substances for potential harm).
164. Id.
165. 21 U.S.C. § 811(c).
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fentanyl analogs, conserves time and resources.166 However, PHASE is
a poor substitute for the eight-factor analysis, which addresses complex
historical, epidemiological, and psychological factors in addition to
chemical and physical properties.167
Two years after Gottlieb unveiled PHASE, the FDA augmented
it with predictive software called Clarity, which is developed and
licensed by Chemotargets, a private company.168 Clarity’s algorithms
were developed using “an expertly curated training set of 2.6 million
compounds,” with data “derived from patents, journals and public
databases.”169 This training set contains many sources of potential bias
that could undermine the accuracy and credibility of PHASE and its
predictions.170 For instance, it includes at least 240,000 U.S. patents
from a database called SureChEMBL, which is maintained by the
European Bioinformatics Institute.171
Patent documents are not peer reviewed, and they can contain
inaccurate and misleading information.172 They are drafted to persuade
the PTO that inventions meet the requirements for patentability.
Inventors are incentivized to make broad claims to monopolize the

166. Ellis et al., Assessing the Structural and Pharmacological Similarity of Newly Identified
Drugs, supra note 146, at 117 (“The human resource requirements to perform an eight-factor
analysis, coupled with the vast number of possible fentanyl analogs, is prohibitively resource
intensive,” claim FDA scientists).
167. See 21 U.S.C. § 811(c) (requiring consideration of the risk of psychological dependence,
the history and current pattern of abuse, and the scope, duration, and significance of abuse).
168. The FDA Licenses Chemotargets CLARITY Platform, UNIV. BARCELONA (May 5,
2020), https://www.pcb.ub.edu/en/the-fda-licenses-chemotargets-clarity-platform [https://perma.cc/
DLC7-4RDF].
169. Clarity Highlights, CHEMOTARGETS, https://www.chemotargets.com/PRODUCTS/
CLARITY-HIGHLIGHTS [https://perma.cc/UVH7-3YNB].
170. See Ellis et al., supra note 29, at e0229649.
171. Anna Gaulton, Identifying Relevant Compounds in Patents, CHEMBL-OG (May 13,
2021), https://chembl.blogspot.com/2021/05/identifying-relevant-compounds-in.html [https://perma.cc/
8CZZ-HQFB]. See generally George Papadatos, Mark Davies, Nathan Dedman, Jon Chambers,
Anna Gaulton, James Siddle, Richard Koks, Sean A. Irvine, Joe Pettersson, Nicko Goncharoff,
Anne Hersey & John P. Overington, SureChEMBL: A Large-Scale, Chemically Annotated Patent
Document Database, 44 NUCLEIC ACID RES. D1220 (2015) (describing SureChEMBL, a publicly
available database containing information on seventeen million compounds extracted from
patent documents).
172. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?, 35 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 421,
423 (2017) (reporting the results of a survey in which scientist respondents stated that patents do
not contain useful information).
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widest swaths of technology possible.173 Furthermore, patent
documents often describe inventions that do not exist and experiments
that have not been conducted.174 These imaginary examples are
potentially harmful because they can mislead and spread
misinformation.175 If incorporated into predictive models, they can
confuse and mislead regulators.
The predictions of Clarity and PHASE may also be biased by the
inclusion of journal articles and public databases in the training set.
Until at least early 2020, this information was drawn from a database
called ChEMBL version 24.176 Because the FDA’s predictive models
rely on Clarity’s predictions, one must know more about the contents
of ChEMBL to evaluate the models’ credibility. Journals and public
databases were reportedly included to “ensure comprehensive
coverage of the chemical space pharmacology,” which suggests that
journals from other fields may have been omitted.177 ChEMBL version
26 was released on March 3, 2020.178 It contains 76,076 documents
drawn from approximately twenty chemistry journals.179 A query of the
database using the search term “kratom” yielded only two articles from
the Journal of Medicine Chemistry, and a search using the term
“mitragynine” returned those documents and two additional articles
from the same journal.180
173. See Alan C. Marco, Joshua D. Sarnoff & Charles A.W. DeGrazia, Patent Claims and
Patent Scope, 48 RES. POL’Y 1, 2 (2019) (stating that overly broad claims can be exploited for rent
seeking).
174. Janet Freilich, Prophetic Patents, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 668 (2019) (reporting that
in over two million chemistry and biology patents issued between 1976 and 2017, 17 percent of
examples were prophetic, and of the patents containing examples, 24 percent had at least some
prophetic examples); see also Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Fakes: How Fraudulent Inventions
Threaten Public Health, Innovation, and the Economy, HARV. L. SCH. BILL HEALTH (July 1,
2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/01/patent-fakes-fraud-inventions-covid
[https://perma.cc/URT9-39AF] (explaining how a company that never developed its technology
could nevertheless have obtained hundreds of patents protecting that nonexistent technology).
175. Freilich, supra note 174, at 712.
176. Ellis et al., supra note 29, at e0229649.
177. CLARITY Highlights, supra note 169.
178. ChEMBL 26 Released, CHEMBL-OG (Mar. 3, 2020), http://chembl.blogspot.com/
2020/03/chembl-26-released.html [https://perma.cc/P6Y8-HYRT].
179. Id.
180. Samuel Obeng, Shyam H. Kamble, Morgan E. Reeves, Luis F. Restrepo, Avi Patel, Mira
Behnke, Nelson J.-Y. Chear, Surash Ramanathan, Abhisheak Sharma, Francisco León, Takato
Hiranita, Bonnie A. Avery, Lance R. McMahon & Christopher R. McCurdy, Investigation of the
Adrenergic and Opioid Binding Affinities, Metabolic Stability, Plasma Protein Binding Properties,
and Functional Effects of Selected Indole-Based Kratom Alkaloids, 63 J. MED. CHEMISTRY 433

MARKS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

AUTOMATING FDA REGULATION

2/24/2022 11:31 AM

1233

Training predictive models using data from only certain fields
while excluding others could bias their predictions. Chemistry articles
may emphasize chemical structure and reactivity, pharmacology
articles may focus on toxicity and mechanisms of action, and drug
policy articles may emphasize the social impact of the availability or
prohibition of substances. Including or excluding each source might
bias predictions in one direction or another. The geographic origin of
articles could also affect predictions. Authors who have spent time in
Southeast Asia, where kratom is commonly grown and consumed, may
have greater familiarity with its effects and more favorable views
regarding its risks and benefits.181 Excluding their viewpoints could
negatively bias model predictions. Similarly, including or excluding
various types of “grey literature,” such as newsletters, internal reports,
blog posts, and corporate promotional materials, could further bias
results.182
Six months after Gottlieb unveiled PHASE, HHS Assistant
Secretary for Health Dr. Brett Giroir sent a letter to the DEA,
instructing its administrator not to schedule kratom.183 His order
rescinded an earlier HHS opinion that had recommended
prohibition.184 “This decision is based on many factors,” said Giroir,
including “the relative lack of evidence, combined with an unknown
and potentially substantial risk to public health if these chemicals were
scheduled at this time.”185 Giroir’s statement regarding a “relative lack
of evidence” for harm suggests that HHS was not impressed by the
FDA’s PHASE predictions.186

(2020); András Váradi et al., Mitragynine/Corynantheidine Pseudoindoxyls as Opioid Analgesics
with Mu Agonism and Delta Antagonism, Which Do Not Recruit -Arrestin-2, 59 J. MED.
CHEMISTRY 8381 (2016).
181. See, e.g., Singh et al., supra note 142, at e2586 (stating kratom does not appear to
adversely affect the health or social functioning of people who consume it in Southeast Asia, and
cases of kratom toxicity are rare).
182. See, e.g., Jean Adams, Frances C. Hillier-Brown, Helen J. Moore, Amelia A. Lake, Vera
Araujo-Soares, Martin White & Carolyn Summerbell, Searching and Synthesizing ‘Grey
Literature’ and ‘Grey Information’ in Public Health: Critical Reflections on Three Case Studies, 5
SYSTEMATIC REVS. 164, 172 (2016).
183. Letter from Brett P. Giroir to Uttam Dhillon 1 (Aug. 16, 2018) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Giroir 2018].
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See id.
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In particular, Giroir explained that prohibiting kratom could have
“immediate adverse public health consequences for potentially
millions of users,” including “intractable pain” and “switching to highly
lethal opioids, including potent and deadly prescription opioids,”
which could cause “thousands of deaths from overdoses and infectious
diseases associated with IV drug use.”187 He expressed concern that
scheduling kratom would further stigmatize the substance, inhibiting
people from discussing it with doctors and stifling important research
on its “potentially useful chemistry.”188 Moreover, he cited a peerreviewed animal study, which found that “mitragynine does not have
abuse potential and actually reduced morphine intake.”189
It is unclear why the FDA continues to use a methodology
discredited by its parent agency.190 In his letter to the DEA, Giroir
listed several details that the FDA had failed to provide such as “[a]
scientific assessment of the actual scale and degree of dependence
and/or addiction of Americans utilizing kratom,” and “[a] scientific
determination based on data whether kratom actually serves as a
gateway drug that promotes further use of more dangerous opioids.”191
Giroir may have been responding to points that Gottlieb raised in the
2018 public statement in which he introduced PHASE, said molecular
models predicted that kratom affects the body “just like opioids,” and
claimed the FDA’s concerns were “rooted in sound science.”192
Further, Giroir’s use of “actual” and “actually” may have been
intended to distinguish real evidence of harm from predictions based
on models and simulations.193
Could the FDA’s persistence be motivated by something other
than public health? Long before adopting PHASE, Gottlieb took a
negative stance on kratom.194 In the years that followed the HHS
ruling, FDA scientists published two articles on PHASE and its

187. Id. at 3–4.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 3.
190. Id. (“The level of scientific data and analysis presented by the FDA and available in the
literature do not meet the criteria for inclusion of kratom or its chemical components in Schedule
I.”).
191. Id. (emphasis added).
192. Gottlieb 2018, supra note 141.
193. See Giroir 2018, supra note 183, at 3.
194. See Gottlieb, supra note 145 (“[Kratom] carries risks of abuse, addiction, and death.”).
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utility.195 A 2019 article explains its benefits as a substitute for the
CSA’s eight-factor analysis while screening fentanyl analogs.196 The
article acknowledged that PHASE ignores several drug characteristics
including absorption, transmission across the blood-brain barrier, and
elimination.197 However, the authors appear to shrug off these
limitations, claiming that whenever predictive models for these
variables are developed, they will incorporate them into PHASE.198 In
2020, the same authors published a second article that praises PHASE
as a means of analyzing kratom’s harm potential.199 The article ignores
the public health risks of prohibition and the lack of actual scientific
data, which were both described by Giroir two years earlier.200
In 2021, Gottlieb, who had by then resigned from the FDA to
serve on the board of drugmaker Pfizer, took to Twitter to express his
dissatisfaction with HHS: “We were prevented by HHS from moving
forward with the scheduling of Kratom, and I’m convinced it’s fueling
the opioid addiction crisis.”201 Thirty minutes later, Giroir responded,
claiming that he had rejected Gottlieb’s recommendation due to
“embarrassingly poor evidence & data, and a failure to consider overall
public health.”202 Giroir added, “If #Kratom is fueling opioid addiction,
prove it . . . .”203
Having been overruled, and failing to prohibit kratom
domestically, the FDA threatened to go over the heads of HHS
195. See generally Ellis et al., supra note 29 (stating PHASE can identify potential safety
signals, providing a tool for prioritizing evaluation of high-risk compounds); Ellis et al., Assessing
the Structural and Pharmacological Similarity of Newly Identified Drugs, supra note 146 (claiming
PHASE can evaluate the similarity of a newly identified drug of abuse to known controlled
substances and inform the public health response).
196. See Ellis et al., Assessing the Structural and Pharmacological Similarity of Newly
Identified Drugs, supra note 146, at 117.
197. Id. at 121.
198. See id.
199. See Ellis et al., supra note 29, at e0229648 (“The PHASE binding profiles of the kratom
alkaloids indicated several biological targets associated with potential adverse effects.”).
200. See Giroir 2018, supra note 183, at 1, 3.
201. Scott Gottlieb (@ScottGottliebMD), TWITTER (May 21, 2021, 6:17 PM),
https://twitter.com/ScottGottliebMD/status/1395866461776891908 [https://perma.cc/5N3E-26K2];
see also Sheila Kaplan, Elizabeth Warren Calls on Former F.D.A. Chief To Quit Pfizer Board,
N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/health/elizabeth-warren-scottgottlieb-pfizer.html [https://perma.cc/3FCD-8M2Y] (reporting Gottlieb's move from the FDA to
Pfizer).
202. Brett
Giroir
(@DrGiroir),
TWITTER
(May
21,
2021,
6:49
PM),
https://twitter.com/drgiroir/status/1395874443726102533 [https://perma.cc/FGV3-6FJK].
203. Id.
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officials by requesting a global ban from the World Health
Organization.204 If it had been successful, the FDA could have
effectively banned kratom domestically and internationally based on
discredited evidence from computer models. However, the World
Health Organization concluded there was “insufficient evidence to
support a critical review of kratom” and declined to pursue a ban.205
2. Virtual Humans and Patient-Specific Models. Despite the
limitations of molecular modeling, which simulates the interactions
between small molecules and their biological targets, the FDA is
pursuing more complex multiscale modeling to simulate human organs
and entire human bodies. The following discussion explains how the
agency uses multiscale models called virtual humans to evaluate new
medical products.
One of the earliest efforts to simulate human physiology was the
Virtual Physiological Human Project, which was founded in 2007.206
Supported by the European Commission, the project developed along
two paths. One approach, developed through a project called
Discipulus, supported the creation of digital patients to predict health
outcomes and create personalized therapies for individuals.207 A
second path, developed through a project called the Avicenna Support
Action, guided the development of cohorts of virtual humans on which
drugs and medical devices could be tested.208
204. Mason Marks, FDA’s Kratom Ban Would Harm the Public and Damage the Agency’s
Credibility, STAT FIRST OP. (Aug. 23, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/08/23/fdas-kratomban-would-harm-the-public-and-damage-the-agencys-credibility [https://perma.cc/5QYY-25DZ].
205. COMM’N ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS, FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 44TH WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION’S (WHO) EXPERT
COMMITTEE ON DRUG DEPENDENCE (ECDD), 11-15 OCTOBER 2021, at 9 (2021), https://
www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessions/CND_64Reconvened/ECN72021
_CRP12_V2108992.pdf [https://perma.cc/NHJ2-BSBY].
206. Peter J. Hunter & Marco Viceconti, VPH-Physiome Project: Standards and Tools for
Multiscale Modeling in Clinical Applications, 2 IEEE REV. BIOMEDICAL ENG’G, 2009, at 40, 40.
207. See DISCIPULUS, VPH INST., ROADMAP FOR THE DIGITAL PATIENT 9 (2013),
https://www.vph-institute.org/upload/discipulus-digital-patient-researchroadmap_5270f44c03856.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVT7-DKVQ].
208. See generally Marco Viceconti, Adriano Henney & Edwin Morley-Fletcher, In Silico
Clinical Trials: How Computer Simulation Will Transform the Biomedical Industry, 3 INT’L J.
CLINICAL TRIALS 37 (2016) (report review) [hereinafter Viceconti et al., In Silico Clinical Trials]
(describing the Avicenna Support Action, which ran from 2013 to 2015); MARCO VICECONTI,
MARCO VICECONTI, JAMES KENNEDY, ADRIANO HENNEY, MARKUS REITERER, SEBASTIAN
POLAK, DIRK COLAERT, JEAN-PIERRE BOISSEL, MARTINA CONTIN, CLAUDIA MAZZÀ,
ANNAMARIA CARUSI, ENRICO DALL’ARA, MATTHEW BURNETT, IWONA ZWIERZAK, KAREN
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Significant progress has been made in creating digital patients to
personalize the care of individuals. Simulating patient physiology helps
surgeons plan procedures and reduce related risk. Prior to complex
heart surgery, such as aortic valve replacement, a patient-specific
model can be built to simulate deployment of an implantable valve and
help predict the outcome.209 One product, called HeartFlow, generates
patient-specific models of coronary blood vessels from radiographic
images of patients’ hearts.210 It predicts the values that a measurement
called fractional flow reserve would produce without subjecting
patients to the risks of cardiac catheterization, an invasive procedure
that is required to obtain the measurement.211
If used incorrectly, or if their predictions are misinterpreted,
patient-specific models can expose people to unnecessary
interventions or cause them to forego lifesaving procedures.
HeartFlow belongs to a class of models that predict the results of risky
procedures that would otherwise be performed if they were less costly,
complex, or dangerous.212 In this context, the lack of safe alternatives
likely justifies their use.
Because patient-specific models are used to diagnose and treat
individuals, the FDA regulates them as medical devices.213 However,
they can be adapted to evaluate the safety and efficacy of other medical
devices in populations instead of individuals.214 For instance, the
SIMULIA Living Heart model has been used to evaluate the
effectiveness of an implantable device designed to treat mitral valve

EL-ARIFI, MASSIMO CELLA, GIUSEPPE ASSOGNA, ROBERT HESTER & FILIPE HELDER MOTA,
IN SILICO CLINICAL TRIALS: HOW COMPUTER SIMULATION WILL TRANSFORM THE
BIOMEDICAL INDUSTRY (2016), https://avicenna-alliance.com/files/user_upload/PDF/Avicenna_
Roadmap.pdf [https://perma.cc/PCD2-2TLY] (reporting the Avicenna Action’s findings and
recommendations); Marco Viceconti & Peter Hunter, The Virtual Physiologic Human: Ten Years
After, 18 ANN. REV. BIOMED. ENG’G 103, 107 (2016).
209. Viceconti & Hunter, supra note 208, at 111.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(h), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (defining
medical device); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HOW TO DETERMINE IF YOUR PRODUCT IS A
MEDICAL DEVICE (2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/classify-your-medical-device/
how-determine-if-your-product-medical-device [https://perma.cc/Q8DP-7JVC].
214. E.g., Karl D’Souza, Technology To Transform Lives: The SIMULIA Living Heart
Model, BENCHMARK MAG. (July 2015), https://www.3ds.com/fileadmin/Industries/lifesciences/pdf/NAFEMS-Benchmark-Technology-to-Save-Lives-LHP-07-01-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M7AT-Y257] (describing the SIMULIA Living Heart).
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regurgitation, where blood leaks back across the mitral valve instead
of into the aorta.215
Since 2007, the FDA has made four anatomically correct wholebody models available.216 Called the Virtual Family, these models
simulate the effects of heat, ultrasound, electromagnetic fields, and
other variables.217 The latest versions represent about three hundred
organs and tissues.218 They can be downloaded for free, and as of 2017,
their predictions had accompanied over 160 FDA medical device
submissions.219 A larger collection, called the Computable Virtual
Population, contains seventeen virtual humans ranging in age from
eight weeks to eighty-four years, collectively representing over 120
anatomical features and more than 300 tissues.220
The future of FDA regulation involves assembling large cohorts
of virtual humans to conduct simulated clinical trials that augment or
replace randomized controlled trials.221 However, when used to
approve novel drugs and medical devices, biased algorithmic
predictions could promote FDA approval of medical products that lack
adequate testing or prevent the FDA from approving safe and effective
products that are incorrectly predicted to be harmful or ineffective.
The following discussion describes ongoing efforts to augment or
replace clinical trials with simulations.
3. Simulated Clinical Trials. The FDA envisions a future where
simulated trials replace a significant portion of its actionable health-

215. See id.
216. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VIRTUAL FAMILY (2017), https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/cdrh-offices/virtual-family [https://perma.cc/425F-LPE9] (describing the FDA’s virtual family
that was created using magnetic resonance image data from volunteers and contains models
representing a thirty-four-year-old adult male, a twenty-six-year-old female, an eleven-year-old
female, and a six-year-old male).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION CENTER FOR
DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH: PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING OUR VISION OF PATIENTS
FIRST 4 (2016), https://www.fda.gov/media/104262/download [https://perma.cc/N5TM-5P8D].
220. Computable Virtual Population: Resolution at Its Limit, IT’IS FOUND.,
https://itis.swiss/virtual-population/virtual-population/vip3 [https://perma.cc/LRD2-UVZP].
221. See Francesco Pappalardo, Giulia Russo, Flora Musuamba Tshinanu & Marco
Viceconti, In Silico Clinical Trials: Concepts and Early Adoptions, 20 BRIEFINGS
BIOINFORMATICS 1699, 1704 (2019) (describing the incorporation of multiple virtual patients into
cohorts to conduct simulated clinical trials).
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care research.222 Agency officials and industry stakeholders extol the
benefits of simulated clinical trials over traditional in vivo experiments,
which are conducted with humans and animals.223 They argue that
simulations make research less expensive, lower the regulatory burden
on product manufacturers, and shorten the time required to obtain
FDA approval, allowing lifesaving therapies to reach the market
sooner.224
Incorporating AI into simulated trials could be advantageous
compared to the use of purely biomathematical models.225 Whereas
linear statistical models are useful only for analyzing structured data
derived from clinical studies, AI models can potentially mine and
incorporate data from a wide variety of sources, including unstructured
data from electronic medical records, radiographic images, and
genomic analysis.226 Proponents also claim that simulated trials pose
fewer risks to human research subjects and will make trials more
inclusive because people with diverse traits can be modeled and
included in virtual cohorts.227
Additionally, proponents contend that simulated trials can
potentially substitute for the control arms of randomized controlled
trials, eliminating the need for people to receive placebos.228 Simulating
control arms could allow every human research participant to join the
intervention arm of a trial and receive the experimental therapy.229

222. See Tina Morrison, Chair, FDA Modeling & Simulation Working Grp., FDA Grand
Rounds: Advancing Regulatory Science with Modeling and Simulation at FDA (Aug. 9, 2018),
https://collaboration.fda.gov/p4r7q3qweuv [https://perma.cc/XTQ2-F75S] (presenting “Future
Opportunities for In Silico Clinical Trials”).
223. See id. (presenting “[s]uccess stories with modeling and simulation at FDA”); see also
Viceconti et al., In Silico Clinical Trials, supra note 208, at 41–42 (discussing how and why
simulated clinical trials could replace human and animal clinical trials).
224. See Morrison, supra note 222, at 25:00 (“[In silico clinical trials . . . enable] safe and
effective new therapeutics to advance more efficiently through the different stages of clinical
trials.” (quoting Gottlieb, supra note 16)); Kolla et al., supra note 17, at 188572 (“[In silico trials]
can salvage the resources devoted to failed pharmacological studies by enabling better powered
trials, simulating control and efficacy arms, and optimizing patient recruitment and drug protocols
in efficacy arms.”).
225. Kolla et al., supra note 17, at 188573; see also Pappalardo et al., supra note 221, at 1701
(“[A]rtificial intelligence technology . . . improve[s] our ability to investigate drug mechanism of
action and drug effects that would be missed entirely by conventional statistical tests.”).
226. Kolla et al., supra note 17, at 188573–74.
227. Id. at 188573.
228. See id.
229. Id.
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Advocates also contend that simulated control arms could eliminate
concerns regarding unblinding, which occurs when research subjects
discover that they were assigned to a control arm and received
placebos.230 Some proponents even claim that simulated trials could
replace the treatment arms of clinical trials instead of the control arm,
or simulate both, potentially eliminating the need for human research
subjects altogether.231
Unlike traditional trials, which are difficult to repeat due to the
associated expense and risks to participants, simulated trials can be run
repeatedly. Through an iterative process, each consecutive cycle can
integrate new patients and data and learn from errors in previous cycles
to improve the model’s predictions.232 Algorithms can potentially add
unlimited numbers of virtual patients to simulated trials and split the
populations into groups for parallel processing, which further increases
speed and reduces the computational resources required.233 If they are
safer, faster, and less expensive than human trials, simulated trials
could reduce the regulatory burden on medical product
manufacturers.234
Simulated trials could also help achieve racial equity. Historically,
racial minorities have been abused and exploited in the name of
scientific research.235 Minorities have also been underrepresented in
clinical trials, and significant disparities persist in contemporary

230. Id.
231. See Pappalardo et al., supra note 221 (stating that when used in conjunction with
postmarket surveillance to confirm simulation predictions, in silico trials could be used as
“conclusive evidence” of safety and efficacy, replacing Phase III clinical trials); see also Kolla et
al., supra note 17, at 188573 (“Given the early success of synthetic control arms, companies have
started to extend this approach for the simulation of intervention arm drug effects —in silico
efficacy arms.”).
232. Kolla et al., supra note 17, at 188574.
233. Id.
234. See Tina M. Morrison, Pras Pathmanathan, Mariam Adwan & Edward Margerrison,
Advancing Regulatory Science with Computational Modeling for Medical Devices at the FDA’s
Office of Science and Engineering Laboratories, 5 FRONTIERS MED., Sept. 2018, at 1, 7
[hereinafter Morrison et al., Advancing Regulatory Science] (describing the FDA’s desire to use
modeling to reduce burdensome data collection associated with animal and human studies).
235. E.g., Allan M. Brandt, Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 8
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21, 21–24 (1978) (describing the infamous case in which the U.S. Public
Health Service unethically studied untreated syphilis in four hundred Black individuals in the
United States under the guise of providing treatment and withheld treatment when it
subsequently became available).
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healthcare and biomedical research.236 In addition to being unjust, a
lack of diversity can negatively impact trial results, decrease
generalizability, and place patients at risk.237 During the COVID-19
pandemic, researchers discovered that spirometers, devices that
measure lung function, systematically treat Black and Asian patients
differently than their white counterparts, potentially producing
dangerous misdiagnoses.238 In addition to making research more
equitable, advocates claim simulated trials could supplement human
participants with comparable virtual humans, yielding more data on
rare diseases because individuals with those conditions can be
challenging to recruit.239
Though augmenting clinical trials with simulations may promote
equity and increase the generalizability of research results, it remains
unclear whether simulations will achieve these goals. Substituting
algorithmic predictions for clinical data could introduce new sources of
bias and create unknown risks. Moreover, in many cases, instead of
simulating people from underrepresented communities, it may be
preferable to address the social obstacles to their equal participation in
clinical research. Participating in clinical trials can have benefits other
than establishing the safety and efficacy of medical products. Some
patients rely on clinical trials to access experimental treatments.240

236. Luther T. Clark, Laurence Watkins, Ileana L. Piña, Mary Elmer, Ola Akinboboye,
Millicent Gorham, Brenda Jamerson, Cassandra McCullough, Christine Pierre, Adam B. Polis,
Gary Puckrein & Jeanne M. Regnante, Increasing Diversity in Clinical Trials: Overcoming Critical
Barriers, 44 CURRENT PROBS. CARDIOLOGY, May 2019, at 148, 149. See generally Merlin
Chowkwanyun & Adolph L. Reed, Jr., Racial Health Disparities and COVID-19 — Caution and
Context, 383 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 201 (2020) (discussing COVID-19’s disparate impact on racial
minority populations and the importance of studying and contextualizing the disparity).
237. See, e.g., Michael W. Sjoding, Robert P. Dickson, Theodore J. Iwashyna, Steven E. Gay
& Thomas S. Valley, Racial Bias in Pulse Oximetry Measurement, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2477,
2477–78 (2020) (reporting racial bias in pulse oximetry measurements, which may have resulted
from testing oximeters in populations lacking racial diversity).
238. See Meredith A. Anderson, Atul Malhotra & Amy L. Non, Could Routine RaceAdjustment of Spirometers Exacerbate Racial Disparities in COVID-19 Recovery?, 9 LANCET
RESPIRATORY MED. 124, 124 (2021) (reporting that spirometers systematically apply a racebased correction or “ethnic adjustment” that assumes Black and Asian patients have lower lung
capacities than their Caucasian counterparts).
239. A. Carlier, A. Vasilevich, M. Maréchal, J. de Boer & L. Geris, In Silico Clinical Trials
for Pediatric Orphan Diseases, 8 SCI. REPS., Feb. 6, 2018, at 1, 1–2, 6, https://www.nature.com/
articles/s41598-018-20737-y [https://perma.cc/KF4K-RLC8].
240. See Arthur L. Caplan & Alison Bateman-House, Should Patients In Need Be Given
Access to Experimental Drugs?, 16 EXPERT OP. PHARMACOTHERAPY 1275, 1276 (2015)
(“Ideally, patients who wish to try an experimental drug should do so in a clinical trial.”).
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Unless alternate means are expanded, some communities may lose
access to experimental therapies if human medical research is reduced
or replaced with simulated trials.
For over a decade, simulations have been used to assess the safety
and efficacy of medical devices.241 In 2011, the FDA deemed a
Medtronic pacemaker safe for use with magnetic resonance imaging
(“MRI”) machines based solely on simulation data.242 Similarly, the
Medical Device Innovation Consortium (“MDIC”), a public-private
partnership between FDA and industry stakeholders, built a model to
simulate a cardiac pacemaker lead, the wire that delivers electrical
impulses from pacemakers to heart tissue.243
The MDIC told the FDA it could simulate a thousand cohorts of
1,000 patients to determine the device’s safety, replacing a 500-person
clinical study that would otherwise be necessary.244 Unlike the
Medtronic pacemaker submission, the MDIC simulation was a mock
FDA submission.245 In 2018, the FDA completed the VICTRE
simulated trial.246 A computer model analyzed the breast images of
2,986 virtual patients to reach a conclusion the FDA claims was
comparable to that of a 600-person human clinical trial.247
Simulated trials have also been used to predict the effects of
pharmaceuticals by replacing control arms with cohorts of virtual
humans.248 These simulated research subjects are exposed to virtual
placebos, and the results are compared to the effects of interventions
administered to real humans in corresponding experimental arms.249
This process has been used to accelerate the approval of several drugs.
In 2015, a pharmaceutical company utilized a simulated control
arm with 68 virtual patients to evaluate the safety and efficacy of

241. Id.
242. Biovia, supra note 23.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Sharma et al., supra note 19.
247. Aldo Badano, Christian G. Graff, Andreu Badal, Diksha Sharma, Rongping Zeng,
Frank W. Samuelson, Stephen J. Glick & Kyle J. Myers, Evaluation of Digital Breast
Tomosynthesis as Replacement of Full-Field Digital Mammography Using an In Silico Imaging
Trial, 7 JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Nov. 30, 2018, at e185474, e185479.
248. Kolla et al., supra note 17, at 188573.
249. Id.
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alectinib, a lung cancer therapy.250 The simulation reduced the time to
FDA approval and increased the duration of European marketing
exclusivity by eighteen months.251 Another team used a similar process
with 694 virtual patients to hasten approval of blinatumomab, which
treats a rare form of leukemia.252 Due to their success with simulated
control arms, companies have expanded this approach to simulating
experimental intervention arms.253
In 2007, a medical device manufacturer simulated joints with
rheumatoid arthritis to compare the efficacy of two interventions for
preventing bone erosion in severe cases.254 The model predicted that
one treatment, rituximab, would be superior to the other intervention,
anti-tumor-necrosis-factor therapies.255 Years later, the prediction was
confirmed through traditional randomized controlled trials.256 More
recently, cancer researchers reported success using simulated trials to
predict which patients with blood cancers were unlikely to respond to
standard treatments.257
Though the technologies described above are impressive, the
FDA acknowledges their limitations. Surprisingly, there has been little
or no discussion of the potential for overreliance on models and
simulations to harm consumers and negatively impact public health.
Though proponents argue that they will democratize medical research,
there is little reason to believe that simulated trials are any less
susceptible to bias than algorithmic models used in other contexts.
Because the FDA’s reliance on them substitutes algorithmic
predictions for direct observations of safety and efficacy, simulated
trials share many risks with the agency’s reliance on surrogate
endpoints. In fact, algorithmic predictions should be framed as a type
of surrogate endpoint.258 However, instead of being surrogates for
direct observation of clinical effects, models and simulations are

250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See Weintraub et al., supra note 8, at 2212 (stating that all endpoints other than
improvements in health status, survival, or cost are surrogate endpoints).
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surrogates for evidence of causation. Consequently, they may be even
less reliable than traditional surrogates.
The best surrogate endpoints lie within the causal chain leading to
a true endpoint, a clinical outcome of interest such as increased
longevity or quality of life.259 Surrogates can be biomarkers produced
by pathologic processes leading to a medical condition of interest.260 In
contrast, the least reliable surrogates are merely associated with a true
endpoint and do not lie within its causal path.261 Even if simulated trials
can infer the likelihood of certain outcomes, these virtual endpoints
remain surrogates for their real-life counterparts because they are
algorithmic predictions and may be of limited epistemological value.
Though imperfect, randomized controlled trials attempt to
establish causality by eliminating, to the extent possible, the influence
of potential causes other than the therapeutic intervention being
investigated.262 Simulated trials cannot ensure that all possible causes
have been considered or eliminated.263 For that reason, some scholars
question their epistemic value.264 Barbara Osimani and colleagues
argue that simulations can supplement, but not replace, randomized
controlled trials because simulations “cannot be equated to
experiments” and “cannot establish new causal laws per se.”265
Nonetheless, some researchers describe simulations as acceptable
surrogates for human trials and other data sources.
Even real-world surrogate endpoints can be problematic
substitutes for clinical outcomes. Though trials using surrogates are
often faster and less expensive than trials yielding clinical outcomes,
the results of the former are less reliable because the relationship
between surrogates and clinical endpoints is often uncertain.266

259. See id. at 2212, 2214 (explaining that a surrogate is most useful when it “consistently
predicts events in the future,” and thus a causal path is stronger than a mere association).
260. See id. at 2214.
261. See id. (explaining that mere association confounds the relationship between a surrogate
and an outcome event).
262. See Barbara Osimani, Marta Bertolaso, Roland Poellinger & Emanuele Frontoni, Real
and Virtual Clinical Trials: A Formal Analysis, 38 TOPOI 411, 412 (2019).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 416.
265. Id. at 420.
266. Weintraub et al., supra note 8, at 2216.
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In particular, surrogates are rarely so reliable that they should
substitute for clinical endpoints in the context of FDA approval.267 A
2015 metanalysis of oncology trials found that in 52 percent of studies,
the correlation between surrogate endpoints and overall patient
survival was low.268 Twenty-five percent of studies showed a moderate
correlation, and only 23 percent showed a high correlation.269
According to some experts, “it seems strange that a clinical trial using
surrogate endpoints and comparing regimens with different timings
could be deemed credible by governmental and private payers, and
least of all by thoughtful physician scientists.”270
Another barrier to trusting simulated trials is the fact that there
are no industry standards or best practices. Though industry
stakeholders often act as though simulations are comparable to human
trials, simulated trials constitute a patchwork of computer models that
were often designed for other contexts. The cobbling together of
different computer models contributes to a lack of uniform practices.
The fact that most computer models are developed by industry
stakeholders to gather evidence on the safety and efficacy of their own
products creates conflicts of interest that must be addressed.
Specifically, medical product manufacturers typically produce the data
on which FDA officials base regulatory approval.271 To the extent that
computer models are proprietary black boxes, and manufacturers
conceal their code and training data, their opacity may conceal bias
that favors industry stakeholders.
Considering the aforementioned technologies and associated
risks, the following Part explains how administrative law doctrine
might apply to FDA models and simulations. It concludes that existing
doctrine is likely too inflexible and unpredictable to address the
transparency and accountability concerns raised by automated FDA
regulation.

267. Id.
268. Vinay Prasad, Chul Kim, Mauricio Burotto & Andrae Vandross, The Strength of
Association Between Surrogate End Points and Survival in Oncology: A Systematic Review of
Trial-Level Meta-Analysis, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1389, 1392 (2015).
269. Id.
270. Knopf et al., supra note 8, at i6287.
271. See Morrison et al., Advancing Regulatory Science, supra note 234 (stating that FDA
reviewers in the Center for Devices and Radiological Health do not run simulations and instead
rely on reports submitted by industry stakeholders).
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III. AUTOMATED FDA REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A significant portion of the legal scholarship on automation and
the administrative state has focused on how agencies should regulate
AI and related technologies.272 An increasing number of authors also
analyze the role of AI in regulatory decision-making.273 However, few
have addressed the role of AI in FDA research or regulation.274 The
following discussion builds on previous scholarship to analyze the
implications of FDA models and simulations for administrative law
and vice versa.
The central doctrine of administrative law coalesced long before
federal agencies adopted computer models and simulations. Much of it
rests upon principles of accountability expressed in statutes such as the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), enacted in 1946, and the
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), enacted in 1966.275 These
statutes often require agencies to operate with a certain degree of
transparency.276 In many cases, when agency action affects people’s
rights, the government must explain its reasoning.277 However, the
272. E.g., Ira S. Rubinstein, Ronald D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz, Data Mining and Internet
Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 261–62
(2008) (describing the use of data mining by government agencies and private companies to
predict behavior and how this practice should be regulated). See generally Ryan Calo, Robotics
and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 556 (2015) (proposing a unified agency,
such as a Federal Robotics Commission, to regulate and provide technical expertise on robotics
and related technologies); Terrel McSweeny, Psychographics, Predictive Analytics, Artificial
Intelligence, & Bots: Is the FTC Keeping Pace?, 2 GA. L. TECH. REV. 514 (2018) (discussing
Federal Trade Commission regulation of AI and related technologies); W. Nicholson Price II,
Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421 (2017) (describing how the FDA should
regulate medical AI); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83 (2017)
(proposing an FDA-like agency to regulate all applications of AI).
273. See generally David Freeman Engstrom & Daniel E. Ho, Algorithmic Accountability in
the Administrative State, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 800 (2020) (explaining how various federal
agencies use AI); ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 30 (same); Frank Pasquale, Normative
Dimensions of Consensual Application of Black Box Artificial Intelligence in Administrative
Adjudication of Benefits Claims, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35 (2021) (detailing how
governments can use black box AI for administrative adjudication); Coglianese & Lehr, supra
note 98 (analyzing how government agencies can use AI for administrative decisions); Arti K.
Rai, Machine Learning at the Patent Office: Lessons for Patents and Administrative Law, 104
IOWA L. REV. 2617 (2019) (explaining how the PTO uses AI); Danielle Keats Citron,
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. L. REV. 1249 (2008) (arguing that usage of AI by
administrative agencies threatens due process norms).
274. See ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 30, at 3, 53; Opderbeck, supra note 30.
275. Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 98, at 1205.
276. Id. at 1205–06.
277. Engstrom & Ho, supra note 273, at 823–24.
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automation of administrative processes complicates matters because
the inner workings of algorithmic models are often opaque and
inscrutable to human observers, which inhibits meaningful
explanation.278 The following discussion explains how the opacity of the
FDA’s computer models intersects with current theories of
administrative law. Part III.B then analyzes how the adoption of AI by
FDA staff effectively delegates legislative authority to software
developers, potentially undermining agency legitimacy.
A. Black Box Simulations and FDA Transparency and
Accountability
Machine learning algorithms are useful because they analyze large
datasets to find and leverage correlations that are imperceptible to
humans.279 These impressive abilities add complexity, and
consequently, many algorithmic models are subject to what experts call
the black box problem.280 Because its reasoning tends to be inscrutable,
algorithmic decision-making can be difficult to comprehend or explain.
The black box problem is part of what Frank Pasquale describes as “the
triple barriers” to public accountability; other factors include trade
secrecy, nondisclosure agreements, and technical complexity.281
Scholars disagree on the social and legal significance of the black
box problem. Some see it as an unavoidable feature of algorithmic
predictions rather than a cause for concern.282 David Freeman
Engstrom and Daniel E. Ho acknowledge that algorithmic opacity
could erode administrative accountability by making agency decisions
less accessible and understandable.283 However, they suggest that in
some cases, algorithms might improve agency transparency.284 By
adopting algorithmic rules as substitutes for unpredictable human
278. See id. at 824.
279. See Marks, supra note 124.
280. See Frank Pasquale, Licensure as Data Governance, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST.
(Sept. 28, 2021), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/licensure-as-data-governance [https://perma.cc/
CP7W-5LW2].
281. Id.
282. See Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1024–25 (2017)
(arguing that having accessible inputs and outputs is more important than algorithmic
transparency for preventing algorithmic discrimination); see also Coglianese & Lehr, supra note
98, at 1206–07 (arguing that, despite the inherent black box nature of algorithms, algorithms can
be examined by humans to promote transparency).
283. Engstrom & Ho, supra note 273, at 821.
284. Id.
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judgment, agencies could standardize their procedures, to some extent,
making their decision-making processes more transparent and
predictable.285
Other scholars question whether transparency in administrative
decision-making is always beneficial or desirable.286 David Pozen
argues that government transparency should not be sought as an end
in itself because, in some cases, greater transparency promotes
negative outcomes.287 Pozen calls for scholars to avoid making abstract
generalizations about transparency policies in favor of drilling down
“into the specific legal, institutional, historical, political, and cultural
contexts in which these policies are crafted and implemented.”288 This
sociological approach to transparency calls for utilizing mixed methods
and “reckoning with transparency in its full complexity as a social
phenomenon.”289 In other words, one must define what one means by
transparency and explain why it is beneficial in different contexts.
Margaret Kwoka and Bridget DuPey distinguish transparency
from the related concept of disclosure.290 They define the former as
“across-the-board requirements for government openness,” and the
latter as “targeted requirements of private organizations to release
otherwise closely held information.”291 However, not everyone makes
this distinction, and people often use the terms interchangeably.292
Some scholars argue that black box algorithms apply a veneer of
objectivity to agency decisions, making them appear more logical,
impartial, and scientific—even when they are not.293 This façade can
promote undeserved trust in agency models and regulatory decisions.

285. Id.
286. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Seeing Transparency More Clearly, 80 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 326,
326–28 (2019).
287. Id. at 327–28 (arguing that bad actors can exploit the information revealed through
government transparency, and in some cases, transparency ties the hands of agencies, creates a
culture of suspicion that reduces trust, and places citizens and the state in an adversarial
relationship).
288. Id. at 326.
289. Id. at 330.
290. Margaret Kwoka & Bridget DuPey, Targeted Transparency as Regulation, 48 FLA. ST.
L. REV. 389, 390 (2021).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 406.
293. See Ryan Calo & Danielle Keats Citron, The Automated Administrative State: A Crisis
of Legitimacy, 70 EMORY L.J. 797, 805 (2021).
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The FDA’s evangelism for molecular modeling illustrates this point.294
Superficially, the PHASE methodology sounds futuristic and
impressive; yet when one digs deeper, there is little substance to be
found.295 Misplaced trust in algorithmic decisions can have harmful
societal and public health consequences.296 Giroir’s 2018 letter to the
DEA describes how lives can be endangered by poor regulatory
decisions.297 More disclosure and greater transparency surrounding
how the FDA and DEA rely on algorithms might reduce the risk by
increasing agency accountability. Because the rules encoded by
predictive algorithms are often hidden from view, they may violate the
letter and spirit of open government laws intended to make agency
conduct accessible. 298 According to Danielle Citron, algorithmic
predictions “endanger the basic right to be given notice of an agency’s
intended actions,” which threatens constitutional and statutory
guarantees of due process.299
Concerns regarding due process guarantees may appear less
salient in the public health context. Courts have failed to find that FDA
decisions threaten fundamental rights or trigger constitutional
protections.300 Nevertheless, FDA research and regulatory decisions
are central to public health, and there are ample opportunities for
outside influence to negatively impact agency decision-making,
elevating the importance of disclosure and transparency to promote

294. See Gottlieb 2018, supra note 141.
295. See Giroir 2018, supra note 183, at 3 (dismissing the FDA’s evidence because it failed to
meet the criteria required for scheduling kratom).
296. Id. at 3–4.
297. Id. (describing the harms that may follow the unnecessary scheduling of kratom under
the CSA).
298. See Citron, supra note 273, at 1281–82 (arguing that automation jeopardizes
transparency and public participation in administrative decisions).
299. Id.
300. See, e.g., Abigail All. v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding no
fundamental right for terminally ill patients to access experimental therapies); see also Mitchell v.
Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[M]ost federal courts have held that a patient does
not have a constitutional right to obtain a particular type of treatment or to obtain treatment from
a particular provider if the government has reasonably prohibited that type of treatment or
provider.”).
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agency accountability.301 Moreover, reliance on algorithmic models in
public health may compound past injustice.302
Deborah Hellman promotes an anticompounding injustice
principle,303 which is particularly relevant to public health regulation
given the government’s history of exploiting marginalized communities
in the name of research and the disparate impact of drug laws on those
communities.304 When taking Pozen’s sociological approach to
transparency, one must consider these historical, political, and
institutional factors.305
In the context of controlled substance regulation, evidence
suggests that the drug scheduling system has racist origins.306 Moreover,
the war on drugs, which was bolstered by passage of the CSA, has
devastated communities of color.307 Even if one accepts that
government transparency is not always desirable, these historical
concerns, numerous examples of algorithmic bias, and existing social
301. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Administration, FDA and DoD Launch
Program To Expedite Availability of Medical Products for the Emergency Care of American
Military Personnel (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fdaand-dod-launch-program-expedite-availability-medical-products-emergency-care-american-military
[https://perma.cc/9P74-FG6B] (announcing the start of an FDA program prioritizing the
development of safe and effective medical products to save the lives of military personnel); see
also Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Administration, FDA and DHS Increase Coordination of
Responses to Medical Device Cybersecurity Threats Under New Partnership; A Part of the Two
Agencies’ Broader Effort to Protect Patient Safety (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/fda-and-dhs-increase-coordination-responses-medical-devicecybersecurity-threats-under-new [https://perma.cc/E8N3-C3HG] (emphasizing the FDA’s role in
ensuring patient protection).
302. See Deborah Hellman, Big Data and Compounding Injustice, U. VA. PUB. L. & LEGAL
THEORY RES. PAPER SERIES, May 2021, at 1, 1 (defining the anticompounding injustice principle,
which states “the fact that an action will compound a prior injustice counts as a reason against
doing that action”).
303. Id.
304. E.g., Brandt, supra note 235, at 21–24; see Doris Marie Provine, Race and Inequality in
the War on Drugs, 7 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 41, 46, 49–51 (2011) (arguing the war on drugs led to
a vast increase in imprisonment of Black individuals in the United States).
305. See Pozen, supra note 286, at 326 (describing the sociological approach to transparency).
306. See Erik Sherman, Nixon’s Drug War, an Excuse To Lock Up Blacks and Protesters,
Continues, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2016/03/23/
nixons-drug-war-an-excuse-to-lock-up-blacks-and-protesters-continues [https://perma.cc/QNR9CPF2] (discussing a 1994 interview in which former Richard Nixon aide John Ehrlichman stated,
“The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the
antiwar left and black people.” (quoting Dan Baum, Legalize It All, HARPER’S MAG. (Apr. 2016),
https://harpers.org/archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all [https://perma.cc/VG3B-GTXL])).
307. See generally Provine, supra note 304 (examining the role of social racism in the war on
drugs).
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and healthcare inequities highlight the importance of promoting
algorithmic transparency in the public health context.
Outsourcing the design and control of algorithms exacerbates
transparency and accountability concerns.308 When agencies adopt
proprietary models, third-party developers may treat their algorithms
and training data as trade secrets.309 Courts have required agencies to
reveal some information about algorithmic decisions, such as the data
inputted into the systems.310 Yet, there is little consensus regarding the
level of detail required.311 FOIA can potentially shed some light on
algorithmic agency decisions.312 However, the statute has constraints
that diminish its utility.313 Under one FOIA exemption, “trade secrets
and commercial or financial information” need not be revealed, which
may limit the public’s ability to compel disclosure of proprietary
algorithms.314 Hannah Bloch-Wehba emphasizes that FOIA’s trade
secret and confidentiality exemption intends to promote information
sharing between the private sector and the government.315 The
exception was not created to obscure agency decisions from public
view.316 However, it could be invoked for that purpose.317
Another FOIA exception creates a “deliberative process
privilege” that shields aspects of government deliberations, such as
interagency or intra-agency memoranda, from outside scrutiny and
interference.318 In theory, it exempts the formulation of agency policy
from public disclosure while leaving accessible the facts on which those
policies are based.319 In 2006, the Environmental Protection Agency

308. See Citron, supra note 273, at 1290.
309. Id. at 1293.
310. See Hanna Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1291
(2020).
311. Id.
312. See id. at 1298 (stating that Congress enacted FOIA to open agency actions to public
scrutiny by creating a process for requesting administrative records and by giving federal courts
jurisdiction to prevent agencies from withholding them—and to order their production when
improperly withheld).
313. See id. at 1299 (explaining that because FOIA only requires the disclosure of records
that an agency controls, some algorithmic agency decisions may still remain secret).
314. Id. at 1300.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1302; see Reilly v. EPA, 429 F. Supp. 2d 335, 341 (D. Mass. 2006).
319. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 310, at 1302–03.
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(“EPA”) invoked the deliberative process privilege to avoid disclosing
details of a computer model it used to analyze different approaches to
pollution control.320
The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts rejected
the EPA’s claim that its model represented the agency’s deliberative
process, finding instead that the model was a fact-finding tool.321
Despite acknowledging that the model’s operation might reflect some
aspects of the EPA’s reasoning, the court framed it as an investigative
instrument that generates evidence to inform agency rulemaking.322 In
other words, on the continuum separating factual information from
deliberative processes, the model’s calculations more closely
resembled facts.323 The court reasoned that in agency fact-finding
investigations, “knowing what questions are asked or which witnesses
are interviewed reveals aspects of what the investigator deemed
important or worthy of consideration.”324
This discussion might suggest that details of the FDA’s computer
models should be accessible under FOIA. However, the agency’s
culture typically resists attempts to compel transparency.325 Besides, as
an enforcement agency, the FDA may qualify for further FOIA
exceptions, potentially limiting public access to the inner workings of
its algorithms.326
Some agencies have taken steps to make their algorithmic
predictions more transparent.327 For instance, the PTO has expressed
an intolerance for black box algorithms.328 In 2016, it awarded a
contract to a company called AI Patents, which develops patent search
algorithms.329 According to the company, its contract was not renewed

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

See Reilly, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 336–37.
Id. at 352–54.
Id. at 352.
Id.
Id.
See David Gortler, How the FDA’s Lack of Transparency Undermines Public Trust,
FORBES (Aug. 24, 2021, 12:36 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidgortler/2021/08/24/howthe-fdas-lack-of-transparency-undermines-public-trust [https://perma.cc/BV2K-NM5C].
326. See Daniel C. Taylor, Taking Touhy Too Far: Why It Is Improper for Federal Agencies
To Unilaterally Convert Subpoenas into FOIA Requests, 99 GEO. L. REV. 1227, 1242–48 (2011)
(describing FOIA exemptions and their application to the FDA).
327. See Rai, supra note 273, at 2639 (describing the PTO’s emphasis on algorithmic
transparency).
328. Id.
329. Id. at 2638.
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due to disagreements with the agency over full transparency.330 For
similar reasons, the EPA prefers adopting nonproprietary computer
models when possible, and for circumstances in which they must be
used, the agency provides guidance for promoting transparency.331 Like
the FDA, the EPA has its own molecular modeling platform, which it
calls ToxCast.332 However, unlike the FDA, the EPA makes its model
available for public use and provides an “owner’s manual” to help
people understand and use the system.333
As algorithmic models increasingly influence government
decisions, agencies could employ more staff capable of designing,
applying, and interpreting them.334 Requiring agencies to build models
internally would keep them up to date on algorithmic technologies and
promote independence instead of reliance on the private sector. In
addition to transparency concerns, close ties with industry create
conflicts of interest, which may be obscured by trade secrecy, the black
box problem, and the veil of objectivity it creates. Moreover, according
to the 2018 ACUS report, designing algorithms in-house makes for
more effective models that are more likely to be designed and deployed
lawfully.335
Aside from developing computer models in-house, there are legal
solutions for promoting transparency. Congress could require thirdparty vendors to make their source code and training data publicly
available.336 The Office of Management and Budget could condition
funding for technology acquisitions on the adoption of nonproprietary
models and open-source code.337 Some experts contend that certain AI

330.
331.

Id.
U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT, EVALUATION, AND
APPLICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODELS 31–32 (2009), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/
files/2015-04/documents/cred_guidance_0309.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP6R-SPD9].
332. Toxicity Forecasting: Advancing the Next Generation of Chemical Evaluation, U.S.
ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/chemical-research/toxicity-forecasting [https://
perma.cc/68HQ-TGU2].
333. See ToxCast Owner’s Manual – Guidance for Exploring Data, U.S. ENV’T PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/chemical-research/toxcast-owners-manual-guidance-exploringdata [https://perma.cc/6Q2L-TNYB].
334. See ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 30, at 7 (stating the importance of in-house AI
expertise).
335. Id.
336. See Citron, supra note 273, at 1308 (arguing that releasing source code would increase
transparency by revealing how a system works).
337. See id. at 1309.
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applications should remain confidential due to national security
concerns.338 However, mandating open-source code at the FDA will
likely mitigate more public health risks than it creates, and publishing
code will allow independent researchers to examine it and run their
own simulations. In fact, Citron suggests that agencies should be
required to test their software using hypothetical scenarios provided by
independent experts, which would help expose unreliable systems.339
Further, the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements could help
improve transparency and accountability when agencies adopt models
and simulations.340 Though the APA requires legislative rules to be
published, not all agency actions are legislative.341 The FDA famously
avoids
notice-and-comment
rulemaking
by
issuing
most
recommendations as industry guidance, which is ostensibly
nonbinding.342 This practice allows the agency to issue de facto rules
while escaping certain procedural safeguards.343 However, unlike other
agencies, the FDA must submit major guidance documents for public
comment prior to their final adoption.344 This requirement stems from
the Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997, which mandates public
participation in the development of significant FDA guidance.345
However, unlike notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA, the
1997 Act does not require the FDA to respond to the public comments
it receives in response to draft guidance.346
Definitions for agency guidance vary. However, the FDA’s
announcement that it had adopted PHASE would arguably qualify.
FDA regulation defines guidance as documents created for applicants,
sponsors, agency staff, or the public that describe FDA policy

338. E.g., id.
339. Id. at 1310.
340. See Engstrom & Ho, supra note 273, at 836.
341. See id. at 836–37.
342. See Lars Noah, Governance by the Backdoor: Administrative Law(lessness) at the FDA,
93 NEB. L. REV. 89, 97 (2014) (explaining how the FDA may utilize nonbinding industry guidance
as de facto rules while avoiding procedural safeguards).
343. Id. at 97.
344. Id. at 99.
345. 21 U.S.C. § 371(h); see also Cary Coglianese, Illuminating Regulatory Guidance, 9 MICH.
J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 243, 257–58 (2020) (distinguishing significant (Level 1) FDA guidance that
requires publication prior to implementation from less significant (Level 2) guidance that does
not).
346. Noah, supra note 342, at 102.
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regarding, or interpretation of, a regulatory issue.347 Guidance can
include documents related to the design and testing of regulated
products, the evaluation or approval of submissions, enforcement
policies, and other matters.348 Gottlieb’s PHASE announcement
ostensibly described agency policies regarding kratom regulation and
the overdose crisis, and it was directed to the public. However, the
FDA might argue that Gottlieb’s announcement was not guidance
because it constituted press materials, editorial content, or general
information provided to consumers, all of which are excluded from the
agency’s definition of guidance.349
One potential solution is to frame the adoption of algorithmic
models as legislative rulemaking by default, requiring it to be subjected
to notice and comment under the APA.350 Engstrom and Ho describe
the factors courts use to identify agency decisions that rise to the level
of legislation.351 However, distinguishing legislative rules from
nonlegislative action may be the most vexing problem of administrative
law.352 One factor courts may consider is the extent to which an
agency’s pronouncement binds its future behavior.353 Whether staff are
bound turns largely on the degree of human involvement that remains
after computer models are adopted, which is open to interpretation.354
Regarding the FDA’s use of molecular modeling, arguably agency
staff could simply disregard model outputs. FDA scientists claim these
predictions are subject to expert review before a scheduling
recommendation is made.355 Moreover, they would likely contend that
because humans remain in the loop, the FDA is not bound by
molecular modeling predictions.356

347. 21 C.F.R. § 10.115(b)(1) (2021).
348. Id. § 10.115(b)(2).
349. Id. § 10.115(b)(3).
350. Engstrom & Ho, supra note 273, at 836.
351. Id. at 837.
352. See David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short
Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 278 (2010).
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Ellis et al., Assessing the Structural and Pharmacological Similarity of Newly Identified
Drugs, supra note 146, at 117.
356. See Engstrom & Ho, supra note 273, at 837.
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However, at least some caselaw argues against this interpretation.
In McLouth Steel Products Corp. v. Thomas,357 the D.C. Circuit
considered whether an EPA computer model was subject to noticeand-comment requirements.358 According to the court, it was
practically irrelevant whether the EPA considered itself bound to the
model’s predictions.359 The agency’s past statements and prior
applications of the model were most determinative.360 Though the EPA
had previously stated that it retained discretion to ignore the model,
and that its predictions were only one of several factors considered in
regulatory decisions, the court pointed to other statements within the
same document that suggested that the agency was bound by the
model’s predictions.361 The EPA had framed its model as “the
quantitative approach” that “will be used” to make predictions
regarding environmental toxins.362 The court said the agency’s use of
the word “will” reflected “the rigor of a rule, not the pliancy of a
policy.”363
Still, FDA staff argue that what makes molecular modeling so
useful is its ability to perform tasks that humans would otherwise
perform.364 They claim the list of substances requiring regulatory
review is so long that it would be cost prohibitive to review each case
manually by performing the entire eight-factor analysis required by the
CSA.365 Accordingly, to the extent that staff forego performance of the
eight-factor analysis, they rely on models to fulfill their statutory
obligations. Instead of merely supporting FDA staff in this role,
algorithm predictions replace their judgments, making agency staff
dependent on them in this context.
Commissioner Gottlieb relied on molecular modeling when he
unveiled PHASE in 2018.366 According to his statement at the time,
“[D]ata from the PHASE model shows us that kratom compounds are

357. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
358. Id. at 1319.
359. Id. at 1320.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1320–21.
364. See Ellis et al., Assessing the Structural and Pharmacological Similarity of Newly
Identified Drugs, supra note 146, at 117.
365. Id.
366. Gottlieb 2018, supra note 141.
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predicted to affect the body just like opioids.”367 Further, “this
highlights the power of our computational model-based approach to
rapidly assess any newly identified natural or synthetic opioids to
respond to a public health emergency.”368 Like the EPA’s intent to rely
on environmental models, Gottlieb’s statements reflect the FDA’s
reliance on algorithms to address the overdose crisis, and they could
represent the “will” described in McLouth Steel.369 However, some
courts are unmoved by a lack of human involvement and refuse to
categorize rulemaking as legislation, even when the promulgating
agency is left with little or no discretion.370
A second factor that can distinguish legislative from nonlegislative
rules is whether a rule has the “force of law,” impacting the rights and
interests of regulated entities.371 In other words, legislative rules
implement the relevant statute instead of merely interpreting it.372 One
might argue that the FDA’s use of models to make scheduling
recommendations lacks legal effect. However, the agency performs
scheduling analyses on behalf of the secretary of HHS, and the
secretary’s determinations bind the DEA.373 Adding a substance to
Schedule I, for instance, renders it illegal and halts related scientific
research.374 Institutions hoping to commercialize or study the substance
would face higher legal and financial barriers.375 Consequently,
adopting algorithmic models to guide scheduling decisions
substantially impacts the interests of regulated parties. In the context

367. Id.
368. Id.
369. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1320–21 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
370. Engstrom & Ho, supra note 273, at 838 (citing Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494
F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2007), where the D.C. Circuit held agreements made by the EPA were
not legislative because ruling otherwise might lower the bar for what constitutes a legislative rule
and potentially make nearly all agency consent agreements subject to notice-and-comment
requirements).
371. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 250 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Legislative rules
have the ‘force and effect of law’. . . .”); Engstrom & Ho, supra note 273, at 837 (stating that
whether a rule “substantially alters the rights and interests of regulated parties” affects whether
it is legislative).
372. Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 758 F.3d at 251–52.
373. 21 U.S.C. § 811(b).
374. See Alex Kreit, Controlled Substances, Uncontrolled Law, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 331,
352–53 (2013) (describing the effect on research of categorizing a substance in Schedule I).
375. See Mason Marks, Psychedelic Medicine for Mental Illness and Substance Use Disorders:
Overcoming Social and Legal Obstacles, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 89 (2018)
(describing the legal and financial barriers to Schedule I drug manufacturing and research).
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of FDA approval, substituting model predictions for clinical data
impacts the rights of drug sponsors and medical device manufacturers.
When the FDA deemed Medtronic’s pacemaker-lead MRI safe using
only simulation data, it saved Medtronic from conducting human
studies with hundreds of patients.376 Consequently, the FDA’s
adoption of models for regulatory decision-making arguably impacts
the rights and interests of regulated parties and could constitute a rule
having the force of law.
Despite the aforementioned arguments, this area of
administrative law is notoriously murky, and establishing that the
FDA’s adoption of computer models constitutes a legislative rule is far
from a clear-cut case.377 Furthermore, notice-and-comment review
itself is an imperfect mechanism for promoting transparency and
accountability. A common criticism is that well-funded entities are
likely best equipped to understand proposed rules and shape them to
promote their interests.378 The public may also lack the motivation to
participate in notice-and-comment rulemaking.379 However, when
citizen groups are impacted by agency decisions, they can mobilize
their membership and capitalize on their relevant expertise to provide
impactful feedback on proposed legislation.380 Consequently, the utility
and importance of notice and comments should not be
underestimated.381
Skeptics may also raise concerns regarding rulemaking
ossification, the theory that bolstering procedural requirements
inordinately increases the time required for agencies to promulgate

376. Owen Faris & Jeffrey Shuren, An FDA Viewpoint on Unique Considerations for
Medical-Device Clinical Trials, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1350, 1353 (2017).
377. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(“[I]t is quite difficult to draw a line between substantive and interpretive rules.”); see also
Franklin, supra note 352, at 287 (reciting a common refrain of courts and administrative law
scholars that describes the distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules as “‘fuzzy,’
‘tenuous,’ ‘blurred,’ ‘baffling,’ and ‘enshrouded in considerable smog’” (first quoting Am. Hosp.
Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987); then quoting Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d
349, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1976); then quoting Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); and then quoting Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975))).
378. Katherine J. Strandburg, Rulemaking and Inscrutable Automated Decision Tools,
COLUM. L. REV. 1851, 1869 (2019).
379. Id. at 1869–70.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 1870.
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regulations.382 Procedural requirements may include performing costbenefit analyses, subjecting rules to notice and comment, explaining
agency reasoning in anticipation of judicial review, and documenting
the quality of the data that informed the rulemaking process.383 Critics
of ossification argue that these burdens cause unnecessary delay,
increase the likelihood that regulation will become obsolete, and
discourage agencies from using the notice-and-comment rulemaking
process.384 Some scholars worry that agencies may respond to
ossification by favoring other means of promulgating rules such as
adjudication.385
Not everyone agrees that ossification is harmful or undesirable.
Some accept it as the cost of ensuring that rules are scientifically
grounded.386 Others contend that ossification can itself be beneficial.387
Aaron Nielson argues that ossification has benefits aside from ensuring
the soundness of promulgated rules.388 For instance, because it makes
changing rules more onerous, ossification helps commit agencies to the
rules they make.389 Relatedly, when changes become more
burdensome, regulated parties can be more confident that
promulgated rules will endure.390 This enhanced confidence, Nielson
argues, may increase the likelihood that regulated parties act in ways
that agencies want them to act.391 Ossification might also increase the
legitimacy of agency actions because delay allows time for public
participation, which in turn builds trust.392

382. See Aaron L. Nielson, Optimal Ossification, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1209, 1210–11
(2018) [hereinafter Nielson, Optimal Ossification] (defining rulemaking ossification); see also
Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 94 (2018) (presenting a common
argument against rulemaking ossification).
383. See Nielson, Optimal Ossification, supra note 382, at 1217; see also Stuart Shapiro,
Embracing Ossification, REGULATION, Winter 2018–2019, at 8, 8.
384. Nielson, Optimal Ossification, supra note 382, at 1215–17.
385. See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An
Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1414, 1463 (2012) (describing how agencies may increasingly turn to adjudication as
rulemaking becomes more difficult).
386. Nielson, Optimal Ossification, supra note 382, at 1219.
387. Id. at 1219–20.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 1220.
390. Id.
391. See id. (explaining how the durability of administrative rules affects the actions of
regulated parties).
392. Id. at 1227.
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In some cases, it may be desirable to promulgate rules quickly.
However, substituting algorithmic models for clinical trials, and other
well-established practices for collecting and analyzing scientific
evidence, should not be one of them. The public health risks of moving
hastily are great, and opportunities for exploiting confusing or
otherwise poorly conceived rules are plentiful. In a time when the
FDA’s reputation is under fire and confidence in public health agencies
is waning, delay that allows for careful deliberation and public
participation seems prudent. To date, the FDA has not sought public
comment on its adoption of computer models.
Notably, some agencies take a different approach. In 2015, the
EPA announced its intent to use molecular modeling in the Federal
Register.393 The technology it disclosed is analogous to the FDA’s
molecular models because it uses algorithmic predictions to infer which
compounds are potentially harmful.394 In addition to seeking public
input, compared to the FDA, the EPA has been more forthcoming
regarding the limitations of computer models used in this context.395 In
the Federal Register, the EPA cautioned the public not to confuse
predictions made by its model with agency determinations that a
particular substance causes harm.396 This caveat stands in contrast to
Gottlieb’s reliance on PHASE to conclude that kratom’s ingredients
“affect the body just like opioids.”397
B. Modeling, Simulation, and Nondelegation
Article II of the U.S. Constitution vests all legislative powers in
Congress.398 However, courts have long permitted Congress to delegate
legislative authority to agencies led by appointed officers.399 In theory,
the nondelegation doctrine imposes limits on the power delegated to
federal agencies.400 Constitutional delegations must be accompanied by

393. Use of High Throughput Assays and Computational Tools, 80 Fed. Reg. 35,350, 35,350
(June 19, 2015).
394. See id. at 35,352 (“To reduce non-specific results, the computational model can use
results from multiple assays and technologies to predict whether a chemical is truly bioactive in
the pathway being evaluated.”).
395. See, e.g., id.
396. Id. at 35,353.
397. Gottlieb 2018, supra note 141.
398. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
399. Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 98, at 1178.
400. Id.
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an intelligible principle to guide agency officials.401 However, for nearly
a century, the Supreme Court has declined to find delegations of
legislative authority unconstitutional, regardless of their breadth.402
Many scholars view nondelegation doctrine as an aspirational
concept of little or no practical importance.403 Some say it was doomed
from the start because the Founders never contemplated such a
principle nor is it reflected in the Constitution.404 Others believe the
doctrine could be salvaged if only it was reimagined.405 In recent years,
a few Supreme Court opinions suggest there may be renewed interest
in the doctrine. Meanwhile, some have questioned whether replacing
agency judgment with algorithmic predictions could constitute the
unlawful delegation of legislative authority.406
Cary Coglianese and David Lehr are unconcerned. They argue
that all machine learning algorithms have objective functions that can
substitute for the intelligible principle required by common law.407 In
contrast, Citron and Ryan Calo question whether an algorithm’s
objective function “bears the slightest resemblance to an intelligible
principle.”408 The traditional justification for delegating legislative
authority to agencies assumes that they possess specialized knowledge
that Congress lacks.409 However, algorithms, as currently designed and
implemented, are poor replacements for real expertise.410 According to
Citron and Calo, by delegating authority to opaque computer models,
agencies transfer power from Congress to software, discarding
discretion and expertise, and rendering the principles underlying
permissible delegations unintelligible.411
Coglianese and Lehr disagree. They frame algorithms as mere
measurement tools, similar to other instruments adopted by agencies,
401. Id.
402. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 295 (6th ed. 2019).
403. Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the Modern
Administrative State, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 150 (2016).
404. See, e.g., Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 279–80 (2021).
405. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 403, at 151 (arguing that nondelegation doctrine should be
reoriented to focus on the nature of the granted authority instead of its scope).
406. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 98, at 1178–80.
407. Id. at 1179.
408. Calo & Citron, supra note 293, at 817.
409. Id. at 816.
410. Id. at 833.
411. Id.
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such as rulers or calculators.412 Nonetheless, it seems nonsensical to
suggest that using rulers and calculators could transfer decision making
authority to their manufacturers, while the notion that adopting
computer models might transfer such authority has greated intuitive
appeal. At the very least, when agencies rely on outside firms to
produce computer models because they lack the expertise to create and
train the models themselves, agencies may undermine their own
credibility and legitimacy.413 The FDA’s continued reliance on
molecular models overruled by HHS, the agency to which Congress
delegated the authority to conduct the CSA’s eight-factor analysis,
lends credibility to this argument.
This discussion suggests that administrative law may be
unprepared for automated FDA regulation. Though some aspects of
the law may be flexible enough to promote algorithmic transparency
and accountability, others must be updated, or other areas of law
should pick up the slack. The following Part suggests blending
principles of AI ethics with existing industry and agency guidance to
fill the gaps left by administrative law.
IV. GOOD SIMULATION PRACTICES
There are currently no standards to guide either the automation
of agency decision-making generally or the use of AI to guide medical
and public health regulatory decisions specifically. To move toward
this goal, this Part analyzes industry and FDA guidance on models and
simulations. After evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of agency
guidance, this Part concludes by incorporating principles of AI ethics
into existing guidance to create good simulation practices that promote
transparency while acknowledging the full spectrum of potential
harms.
A. Industry and Agency Guidance
The FDA has published a series of documents on modeling and
simulation.414 It identifies the adoption of these technologies as agency
412.
413.
414.

Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 98, at 1181.
See Calo & Citron, supra note 293, at 833, 835.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REPORTING OF COMPUTATIONAL MODELING
STUDIES IN MEDICAL DEVICE SUBMISSIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION STAFF 2 (2016) (providing guidance to industry stakeholders on how to submit
modeling information to the FDA); see also Credibility of Computational Models Program, supra
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priorities.415 One of the FDA’s primary goals is to reduce its reliance
on clinical trials by augmenting or replacing them with simulations in
which devices are tested on cohorts of virtual patients.416 However, the
FDA acknowledges that the credibility of computer models has not
been fully established.417 Accordingly, it created an initiative called the
Credibility of Computational Models Program.418
Both the FDA and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(“ASME”) acknowledge that the credibility of models turns on
whether people trust their predictive capabilities.419 The FDA
identifies major gaps and challenges associated with establishing
trust.420 According to agency reports, many existing and proposed
models have not been rigorously evaluated, and their credibility is
unknown.421 Some have known deficiencies that negatively affect their
credibility.422 There is a paucity of quality clinical or experimental data
available to help develop and validate models and simulations,
especially data derived from humans under real-world conditions.423
There are insufficient validation tools and metrics, and reliable
methods do not exist to evaluate the acceptability of virtual patients in
a cohort.424 Moreover, there is a lack of tools to verify relevant
computer code and calculations and a lack of decision-making
frameworks to evaluate the overall credibility of models.425 Finally,
there are no established best practices.426

note 107 (providing draft guidance to industry on establishing the credibility of computer models);
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ASSESSING THE CREDIBILITY OF COMPUTATIONAL MODELING
AND SIMULATION IN MEDICAL DEVICE SUBMISSIONS: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 4–5 (2021) [hereinafter FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE
2021] (providing draft guidance for industry and FDA staff).
415. Credibility of Computational Models Program, supra note 107; see also Morrison et al.,
supra note 107 (stating that computer modeling is a top priority for the FDA's Center for Devices
and Radiological Health).
416. Credibility of Computational Models Program, supra note 107.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.; Morrison et al., supra note 107, at 349.
420. Credibility of Computational Models Program, supra note 107.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
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One existing framework for evaluating model credibility was
designed by the ASME Verification & Validation 40 (“V&V 40”)
Subcommittee. 427 According to ASME, verification involves proving
that the equations solved by a model are mathematically correct, and
validation entails demonstrating that the right equations are being
solved to address the questions the model is being used to answer.428
This definition serves as a reminder that computer models are
mathematical abstractions bearing no meaningful resemblance to their
real-world counterparts.
To illustrate how the V&V 40 framework is applied, FDA and
industry researchers used it to evaluate a hypothetical model intended
to simulate a centrifugal blood pump, a medical device that aids
circulation, to predict the risk of red blood cell rupture, or hemolysis.429
The V&V 40 framework assumes that the level of evidence required to
establish model credibility should vary with the risk associated with
using the model to guide clinical or regulatory decisions.430 In other
words, the framework should adapt to the unique risks of different
applications. It describes four steps for determining the level of
evidence required: identifying a question the model is intended to
address; defining the context in which the model will be used and
drafting a detailed statement determining its specific role in addressing
the question of interest; assessing the model risk, defined as the
likelihood that adopting the model will produce decisions that harm
patients or lead to other undesirable outcomes; and identifying
credibility factors, goals for various aspects of the verification and
validation process, which are influenced by the model risk.431
Model risk is affected by the degree to which a model influences
decision-making, called the model influence, and the significance of
adverse outcomes resulting from reliance on the model, called the
decision consequence.432 Models that play only minor roles in a

427. Morrison et al., supra note 107, at 350.
428. Colleen Kuemmel, Yuching Yang, Xinyuan Zhang, Jeffry Florian, Hao Zhu, Million
Tegenge, Shiew-Mei Huang, Yaning Wang, Tina Morrison & Issam Zineh, Consideration of a
Credibility Assessment Framework in Model-Informed Drug Development: Potential Application
to Physiologically-Based Pharmacokinetic Modeling and Simulation, 9 CPT PHARMACOMETRICS
SYS. PHARMACOLOGY 21, 25 (2020).
429. Morrison et al., supra note 107, at 350.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id.
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decision have lower model influence than models that are heavily
relied upon.433 Both model influence and decision consequence are
determined by the context of use, which requires model risk
calculations to be context specific.434 Moreover, the credibility of a
model should match its risk. High-risk models require significantly
more evidence of credibility than low- or moderate-risk models.435
ASME has provided a list of thirteen factors that can help establish
credibility.436 Like model influence and model risk, credibility factors
may vary with the context of use.437 Analyzing the relevance of
credibility factors to the context of use, and the relevance of the
phenomena being modeled, is called determining model
applicability.438
When using the V&V 40 framework to determine the evidence
required to establish the credibility of the blood pump model,
researchers first identified a question the model would help them
answer. They wanted to know whether hemolysis caused by the pump
would fall within acceptable levels.439 They identified two contexts of
use for comparison.440 In the first, the model would predict how the
pump would perform in a benchtop test prior to surgery.441 This
scenario was presumably chosen because it represents a low- to
moderate-risk application. In the second context, the model would
simulate hemolysis levels of an implanted pump that assists a patient’s
circulation at home.442
Researchers determined that in the context of simulating
preoperative testing, the model influence would be low because
surgical decision making would be based on the outcome of
preoperative benchtop testing instead of being influenced directly by
the simulation, which would only determine the testing parameters.443
433. See Kuemmel et al., supra note 428, at 24 (providing a table that defines low, medium,
and high model influence based on the ratio between the influence of model evidence and clinical
evidence).
434. Kuemmel et al., supra note 428.
435. See id. at 22.
436. Id. at 23 tbl.2.
437. Id. at 22.
438. See Morrison et al., supra note 107, at 355.
439. Id. at 351.
440. Id.
441. See id. at 351, 352 tbl.2.
442. See id.
443. Id. at 352 tbl.2.
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The researchers estimated the decision consequence of the model to
be medium because if the pump caused severe hemolysis in the
operating room, surgeons could quickly mitigate the harm and the
pump could even be replaced.444
For the second context of use, simulating at-home use of an
implanted pump, the researchers determined the model influence to be
high because clinical decisions would be directly influenced by the
simulation instead of a preclinical test.445 Similarly, they found the
decision consequence to be high because the pump would be implanted
and patients would be far from an operating room, making it more
difficult to mitigate harm or to replace a failing pump.446
To summarize their results, researchers created a three-by-three
matrix called a model risk map, with decision consequence on the xaxis and model influence on the y-axis.447 The matrix suggests that
contexts of use with high model influence and high decision
consequence have the greatest model risk—five out of five—requiring
the strongest evidence of model credibility to justify adoption.448 In
contrast, contexts of use with low model influence and low decision
consequence have the lowest model risk—one out of five—requiring
the least evidence of credibility.449 The researchers concluded that
using the simulation to inform benchtop testing prior to surgery carried
a model risk of two, and using it to guide decisions outside the
operating room carried a model risk of five.450

444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 355; Kuemmel et al., supra note 428, at 24.
Morrison et al., supra note 107, at 353, 355.
Id.
Id. at 351, 355.
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Figure 2: Discrete Risk Map

Though useful for explaining how model influence and decision
consequence shape model risk, this application of the V&V 40
framework has shortcomings that limit generalizability. For instance,
the researchers only evaluated models for simulating clinical and
preclinical scenarios.451 They did not assess the framework’s ability to
evaluate models that guide regulatory decisions, which would entail
different kinds of risks and credibility factors. In addition, they did not
consider AI or its associated risks and harms, such as low-quality
training data and algorithmic bias. This omission may not be surprising
because the V&V 40 framework was not designed for models that use
AI. Instead, it was created to assess the credibility of physics-based
models. The framework also assumes that the risks associated with
models and each context of use are foreseeable. However, AI-related
risks are often difficult to forecast because they involve many
unknowns.452
Another limitation of this example is the nature of the simulated
technology. Centrifugal blood pumps are relatively simple mechanical

451. Id. at 352 tbl.2.
452. See Wayne Holmes, Kaska Porayska-Pomsta, Ken Holstein, Emma Sutherland, Toby
Baker, Simon Buckingham Shum, Olga C. Santos, Mercedes T. Rodrigo, Mutlu Cukurova, Ig
Ibert Bittencourt & Kenneth R. Koedinger, Ethics of AI in Education: Towards a CommunityWide Framework, INT’L J. A.I. EDUC., Apr. 9, 2021, at 1, 18–19, https://link.springer.com/content/
pdf/10.1007/s40593-021-00239-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UJ2-B5YF] (discussing the importance of
considering unknown unknowns regarding the use of AI in education).
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devices. Consequently, they are more easily emulated using wellknown equations for modeling fluid dynamics, rather than more
complex biological structures such as molecules, organs, and people.
“[W]e’re really good at simulating medical devices, they’re hunks of
metal with electronics and all these small parts,” said the FDA’s
Morrison.453 It is far more challenging to simulate complex biological
systems. However, such systems are increasingly modeled by both the
FDA and product manufacturers hoping to secure regulatory approval,
and such models increasingly rely on AI.454
In a 2020 article coauthored with other FDA scientists, Morrison
claims there is “no consensus among modeling and simulation
approaches or regulatory authorities on how to establish or assess the
credibility of a model for regulatory purposes.”455 The lack of standards
for assessing model safety and fairness is concerning due to rising
pressure from government and industry to model biological systems
and substitute simulations for clinical evidence. The authors describe
the need for an expanded framework to establishing the credibility of
models used in regulatory contexts.456 Building upon previous
discussions of the V&V 40 framework, they introduce more robust
ways to determine decision consequence, which could make the
framework more useful to regulatory agencies.457 For instance, they
suggest that the decision consequence should increase with the number
of people potentially impacted by incorrect decisions, the severity of
potential harms, and the likelihood that those harms could occur.458
Decisions that would not adversely affect patient safety have a low
decision consequence.459 In contrast, decisions that could produce
minor or moderate harms have a medium decision consequence, and
those that could produce severe harms are assigned a high decision
consequence.460

453.
454.

Biovia, supra note 23.
Id.; see also Artificial Intelligence for Regulatory Science Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (May 14, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/science-research/fda-grand-rounds/artificial-intelligenceregulatory-science-research-05142020-05142020 [https://perma.cc/C46J-CV45] (describing how the
FDAs National Center for Toxicological Research utilizes AI in its regulatory work).
455. Kuemmel et al., supra note 428, at 21.
456. Id.
457. See id. at 24.
458. See id.
459. Id.
460. Id.
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The authors apply the updated framework to two contexts of use
In which clinical trials would evaluate drug safety and efficacy.461 The
first involves using a model to infer how an experimental drug should
be dosed when coadministered with another drug with known
metabolic effects.462 The authors determine the decision influence to
be high because model predictions would be used in lieu of clinical
trials for most of the patient population.463 The second context of use
involves determining the optimal dose of the drug for children.464 The
authors determine the decision influence was low because clinical trials
would be conducted for all patient populations.465 Only the starting
dose for the pediatric clinical trial would be determined by algorithmic
predictions alone, and the final dose of the labeled product would be
influenced by a combination of clinical and algorithmic data.466
The authors make several important observations and
recommendations. They acknowledge that adopting the ASME
credibility framework would require regulators and product
manufacturers to change how they assess computer models.467
Specifically, regulators must understand and accept that model risk
determines the selection of credibility factors, and the more rigorous
the factors, the higher their applicability to the intended use, and the
higher the model credibility.468 They suggest that a team of experts
determine the appropriate level of rigor.469 They also indicate that
different people applying the framework might reach different
conclusions, and, to alleviate this concern, they emphasize that this
possibility exists whether or not a framework is adopted.470 Finally,
they advocate for public discussions regarding the framework involving
multiple stakeholders.471

461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 23, 25.
See id. at 25.
Id. at 23, 25.
Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 25.
See id. (outlining new processes for verifying the accuracy and reliability of models).
Id. at 22, 24–25.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 27.
Id.
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Other FDA scientists have attempted to clarify the types of
information that can help establish model credibility.472 They provide
eight factors, such as the pedigree of input data and the quantification
of uncertainty.473 They also suggest creating a preassessment plan
describing the methods for acquiring and analyzing data and including
evidence to establish that data sources are of sufficient quality to
establish model credibility.474 The inclusion of these factors and
recommendations adds new dimensions to the V&V 40 framework.
In late 2021, the FDA published draft guidance for assessing the
credibility of computational models used to evaluate medical
devices.475 The draft incorporates suggestions made by agency scientists
in their analysis of the V&V 40 framework.476 It recommends that
device manufacturers provide a credibility assessment plan and seek
FDA feedback.477 Additionally, the agency recommends inclusion of a
credibility assessment report when submitting the results of modeling
studies or simulated trials.478 The report should state the evidence and
rationale supporting model credibility.479 However, the document
provides no details on how to gather that evidence.480
Despite making useful recommendations, the draft guidance omits
many prior suggestions from FDA staff. There is no mention of
training data or the importance of evaluating its quality and pedigree.481
The recommendation to adjust decision consequence based on the
number of people potentially impacted by a model’s adoption was also
overlooked. Moreover, some sections of the draft guidance are likely
to confuse industry stakeholders and the public. For instance, the FDA
states that its proposed guidance “is not intended to apply to statistical
or data-driven models such as machine learning or artificial
intelligence.”482 However, the document mentions augmenting or
replacing human trials with simulated trials consisting of virtual

472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.

See POPELAR ET AL., supra note 113.
Id.
Id.
FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE 2021, supra note 414, at 4–5.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 5.
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patients,483 which requires AI to be successful according to Morrison
and other FDA scientists.484 Moreover, the draft guidance discusses
models used to estimate measurements such as fractional flow
reserve.485 Though not mentioned by name in the document,
HeartFlow is a prominent example of such a model,486 and it uses “an
advanced form of AI called deep learning.”487 Consequently, readers
may not understand whether the draft guidance applies to simulated
trials or to HeartFlow and similar products that infer fractional flow
research and other measurements. The document’s omission of AIbased models is also surprising given their status among the FDA’s
strategic priorities.488
The draft guidance has other shortcomings. It applies only to
models used to address medical devices and does not address models
for evaluating drugs and biological products, for which there is only
limited guidance that similarly excludes discussion of AI.489 Moreover,
the FDA frames the draft guidance as a risk-based framework for
evaluating model credibility.490 However, it defines risk narrowly in
terms of harm to individual patients, trial participants, or healthcare
providers, overlooking the broader impact to society and public
health.491 The document only emphasizes factors that support model
credibility. It does not encourage manufacturers to analyze and
acknowledge the shortcomings of their models. Finally, the draft omits
discussion of proprietary models and the benefits of open-source code,

483. Id. at 5–6 (referencing in silico trials).
484. Morrison et al., Advancing Regulatory Science, supra note 234, at 8 (stating that
achieving the same results as human trials with simulated trials “relies on statistical models, deep
learning and artificial intelligence”).
485. FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE 2021, supra note 414, at 21.
486. See supra notes 209–212 and accompanying text.
487. Our Technology Core, HEARTFLOW (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.heartflow.com/
heartflow-ffrct-analysis/article/our-technology-core [https://perma.cc/GN9Q-N2RS].
488. See Morrison, Advancing Regulatory Science, supra note 234, at 3 (emphasizing the role
of data mining, machine learning, and deep learning in computational modeling).
489. FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE 2021, supra note 414, at 7; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., POPULATION PHARMACOKINETICS 1 (2021) (providing guidance for regulatory
submissions that rely on population-based pharmacokinetic models); U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., PHYSIOLOGICALLY BASED PHARMACOKINETIC ANALYSIS—FORMAT AND CONTENT
1 (2018) (providing guidance for regulatory submissions that rely on physiologically-based
pharmacokinetic models).
490. FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE 2021, supra note 414, at 4–5.
491. See id. at 14–15.
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methods, and data sets.492 Instead of creating clear standards and
promoting uniform regulatory submissions, which would increase
transparency and efficiency, the draft’s lack of specificity and
discussion of non-proprietary models may promote further expansion
of the existing patchwork of modeling approaches.
Though the draft guidance is intended for FDA staff as well as
industry stakeholders, it omits discussion of staff utilization or
interpretation of computer models. To help fill this gap, the following
discussion applies the V&V 40 framework to agency decision-making.
Specifically, it analyzes the FDA’s adoption of molecular modeling to
make scheduling recommendations. Though the V&V 40 framework
was not intended to evaluate the credibility of AI-based models, its
principles remain useful when applied to them. The following
discussion highlights the need for expansion of existing credibility
frameworks and FDA guidance.
B. Evaluating the Credibility of a Regulatory Model
The FDA’s draft guidance recommends that medical device
manufacturers use the V&V 40 framework to evaluate the credibility
of their computer models. However, the agency makes no comparable
recommendations to its staff and departments to evaluate the
credibility of models they develop or adopt. This Section applies the
V&V 40 framework to the FDA’s PHASE methodology.
It should be acknowledged that using models to predict the harm
potential of substances for scheduling purposes differs from using them
to simulate patients and clinical trials to evaluate product safety and
effectiveness. However, the principles remain are the same. In both
contexts, models draw inferences from data, and biased training data
will produce biased algorithms and outputs. Moreover, in both cases,
inaccurate and biased predictions can harm people and compound past
injustice.
In the context of substance regulation, the model influence would
be high because the FDA substitutes model predictions for elements
of the CSA’s eight-factor analysis.493 Agency staff might argue that the
model influence is at most moderate because they can ignore the model
492. See generally id. (lacking discussion of proprietary models or open-source code,
methods, and data sets).
493. See Gottlieb 2018, supra note 141; see also Ellis et al., Assessing the Structural and
Pharmacological Similarity of Newly Identified Drugs, supra note 146, at 117.
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predictions, and decision consequence is at most moderate because
inaccurate prediction do not guarantee that kratom will be scheduled.
However, FDA staff rely heavily on molecular models, which they
systematically use to automate the evaluation of unregulated
substances.494 Moreover, using the rubric for model influence provided
by FDA scientists, if no clinical trial data will be used to inform a
regulatory decision, and a computer model provides the bulk of the
actionable information, then the model influence should be high.495
The decision consequence would also be high because an incorrect
decision from the FDA could result in a ban that would indefinitely
remove a substance from the marketplace and inhibit scientific
research.496 Scheduling substances is a nuclear option that can cause
significant harm.497 As Giroir describes in his 2018 letter, prohibiting
kratom could have caused “immediate adverse public health
consequences” for millions of users, including intractable pain, the
replacement of kratom with more harmful substances, and fatal
overdose associated with consuming those substances.498 These results
represent the downstream public health impact, which should be
considered when relying on models to make regulatory decisions. The
number of affected individuals would be high because millions of
people use kratom in the United States.
As explained by FDA scientists, the number of people affected by
an incorrect conclusion affects the decision consequence.499 Because
millions of individuals across the United States could potentially be
impacted by a kratom ban, the decision consequence of using models
to determine kratom’s regulatory status should increase.500 Finally,
because the model influence and decision consequence are high, the
model risk should equal five.

494. See Ellis et al., Assessing the Structural and Pharmacological Similarity of Newly
Identified Drugs, supra note 146, at 117.
495. See Kuemmel et al., supra note 428, at 21, 24.
496. See id. at 24.
497. See Giroir 2018, supra note 183, at 3.
498. Id. at 3–4.
499. See Kuemmel et al., supra note 428, at 24.
500. See Giroir 2018, supra note 183, at 3.
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Figure 3: Continuous Risk Map

The FDA might claim that the benefits of using molecular models
are so great that their positive impact on public health justifies their
use. For instance, adopting the model conserves agency resources.
However, the V&V 40 framework does not account for the benefits of
adopting computer models. Instead, as a risk-based framework, it
focuses on the harms of drawing incorrect conclusions.501
Perhaps the most concerning aspect of the FDA’s adoption of
molecular modeling is the technology’s poor applicability for the task
of predicting whether substances are harmful.502 In its PHASE
methodology, the FDA uses models that simulate chemical structure
and predict binding affinity.503 As discussed previously, these variables
are only two of many factors that determine drug effects.504 The
exclusion of other equally important variables, such as biased agonism,
renders the FDA’s models a poor choice for predicting harm and
determining scheduling status. These shortcomings affect how
501. Id.
502. See, e.g., Morrison et al., supra note 107, at 355 (finding a molecular model could not
predict hemolysis).
503. Gottlieb 2018, supra note 141.
504. See Bloom, supra note 154; see also Ellis et al., Assessing the Structural and
Pharmacological Similarity of Newly Identified Drugs, supra note 146, at 121.

MARKS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

AUTOMATING FDA REGULATION

2/24/2022 11:31 AM

1275

applicable the models are to this context of use, which should have
prevented their adoption. At the very least, with respect to credibility
assessment, poor applicability should significantly increase the quality
and quantity of factors required to establish credibility.
Other factors that the FDA should have considered before
adopting molecular models include the opacity of the algorithms and
whether they are proprietary or open source; the pedigree of the
model’s training and input data; who developed the models and
whether they have conflicts of interest; whether the model’s adoption
was subjected to notice and comment; whether the question of interest
could be answered using other means that are more transparent and
produce higher quality data; and whether the models’ adoption could
compound past injustice.
The logic of the FDA’s molecular modeling software is opaque
largely because it relies on proprietary technology developed by a
private drug company, which also creates conflicts of interest. The
models’ training data contain numerous sources of potential bias such
as patent documents and academic articles drawn from a narrow range
of sources. Though the FDA’s adoption of molecular modeling
arguably constitutes a rule, or at the very least industry guidance, it was
not published or subjected to notice and comment requirements. Other
credible sources of information, such as animal studies and scientific
reports, were available to inform scheduling decisions, yet the FDA’s
recommendations were largely based on model outputs. Scheduling
kratom would potentially impact millions of people who consume
kratom, threatening public health, and scientific progress would be
prevented by increased restrictions on kratom research. Because many
users of kratom belong to historically marginalized communities,
adopting molecular modeling in this context could compound past
injustice.505 Considering this analysis, the FDA’s molecular models lack
credibility, and their use in drug scheduling should be reevaluated.

505. See Kirsten E. Smith, Kelly Dunn, Oliver Grundmann, Albert Garcia-Romeu, Jeffrey
M. Rogers, Marc T. Swogger & David H. Epstein, Social, Psychological, and Substance Use
Characteristics of U.S. Adults Who Use Kratom: Initial Findings from an Online, Crowdsourced
Study, EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 2, 6 (Nov. 4, 2021),
https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2022-00103-001 [https://perma.cc/G45B-DP7F] (reporting that
substance use and mental health conditions are common in people who use kratom, and social,
psychological, and health indicators are lower in groups that consume kratom compared to those
who do not).
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The following Section makes recommendations for improving
existing credibility frameworks to increase their utility in all public
health contexts.
C. Recommendations
The FDA should update its practices and guidance to account for
the full impact of model design, training, and deployment on model
credibility and public health. Drawing from the field of AI ethics and
previous suggestions from FDA staff, this Section makes
recommendations to enhance the utility of credibility frameworks like
the V&V 40. These recommendations should be followed whenever
the FDA adopts or interprets models to make regulatory decisions.
They are equally applicable to research institutions, product
manufacturers, and other stakeholders.
1. Form Independent Boards to Assess Model Credibility.
Research institutions, product manufacturers, and public health
agencies should form independent boards to assess model risk and
credibility. In some settings, institutional review boards could fill this
role.506 However, they may require modification and training to meet
the challenges of assessing models credibility.507 To avoid conflicts of
interest, review boards should be independent, and their members
should lack ties to researchers, regulators, and the products being
evaluated.508 To promote equity and consideration of the full spectrum
of risks, boards should be diverse and include representatives from
communities likely to be impacted by the models being evaluated.509
To avoid playing only a symbolic role, review boards should have
authority to require that changes be made to models, their training
data, and their range and mode of application.510
Models should neither be utilized outside the range of tasks for
which they were designed nor used to analyze information that differs

506. See generally Phoebe Friesen, Rachel Douglas-Jones, Mason Marks, Robin Pierce,
Katherine Fletcher, Abhishek Mishra, Jessica Lorimer, Carissa Véliz, Nina Hallowell, Mackenzie
Graham, Mei Sum Chan, Huw Davies & Taj Sallamuddin, Governing AI-Driven Health Research:
Are IRBs Up to the Task?, 43 ETHICS & HUMAN RES. 35 (2021) (discussing the AI industry’s use
of internal review boards and their efficacy).
507. See id. at 37–38.
508. Id. at 39.
509. Id.
510. Id.
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significantly from their training data. When models are deployed near
the limits of their optimal context of use, boards should require
stronger evidence of credibility, and they should deem models
uncredible if applied outside those bounds.
2. Consider the Full Spectrum of Algorithmic Harms. The FDA is
not accustomed to evaluating algorithmic harms.511 Its risk analysis
framework is outdated and focuses too narrowly on harms associated
with traditional medical products, such as physical injury from
malfunctioning devices.512 Even the FDA’s recent guidance on
evaluating model credibility, which the agency describes as a “riskbased framework,” takes an antiquated approach by defining risk only
in terms of harm to individual patients or research participants.513
When adopting computer models and interpreting or reporting
their outputs, FDA staff and industry stakeholders should consider the
full spectrum of potential harms, including the potential for
downstream public health effects and compounding prior injustice. For
instance, they should assess whether regulatory decisions informed by
computer models might impact historically marginalized communities.
If the potential to compound prior injustice is high, then model risk
should be considered high, and the model should not be adopted. If the
potential to compound prior injustice is medium, then stronger
evidence should be required to establish model credibility compared to
models for which the potential to compound prior injustice is low.
Similarly, stronger evidence of credibility should be required when the
size or vulnerability of the impacted population grows.
When the FDA adopts computer models to assess product safety,
or to support regulatory decision-making, it should complete an
algorithmic impact assessment and publish the results for public
comment.514 Moreover, when industry stakeholders submit model data

511. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE
LEARNING IN SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE 1 (2021), https://www.fda.gov/media/
145022/download [https://perma.cc/8J34-R5QJ] (describing the FDA’s plan for regulating AI,
which has not been finalized).
512. See Marks, supra note 124, at 1044–45 (describing the FDA’s outdated risk analysis
framework).
513. FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE 2021, supra note 414, at 15.
514. DILLON REISMAN, JASON SCHULTZ, KATE CRAWFORD & MEREDITH WHITTAKER,
ALGORITHMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENTS: A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC AGENCY
ACCOUNTABILITY 15 (2018) (describing the ability of algorithmic impact assessments to increase
an agency’s internal capacity to better understand and explain the impacts of a system before
implementing it).
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to the FDA, they should include the results of an internal algorithmic
impact assessment. Product manufacturers should acknowledge and
disclose the limitations of their models, and a lack of disclosure should
negatively impact model credibility. The FDA should update current
guidance to inform stakeholders of these requirements.
3. Assess Institutional and Algorithmic Opacity. Like the PTO, the
FDA should prioritize in-house development of computer models.
Doing so will bolster agency expertise, build public trust, and enhance
the legitimacy of agency decisions. Congress should fund the FDA’s
development of nonproprietary models that, like the virtual family of
anatomical models, are made freely available to researchers and
industry stakeholders.
When adopting models created by industry is unavoidable, or
when the FDA must interpret their outputs, the agency should consider
whether the models and their training data are proprietary or open
source. If a model’s source code or training data is proprietary,
significantly stronger evidence should be required to establish its
credibility. Manufacturers and the FDA should disclose conflicts of
interest and acknowledge how reliance on proprietary models might
bias results and mislead regulators and the public.
To promote trust and the legitimacy of FDA decisions, the agency
should treat its adoption of computer models as rulemaking subject to
notice-and-comment requirements. At the very least, the agency
should follow its own good guidance practices and treat its adoption of
models as significant (Level 1) guidance requiring publication in the
Federal Register. If the FDA’s adoption of a computer model has not
been published, then far stronger evidence should be required to
establish its credibility.
4. Analyze the Pedigree of Training Data and Incentivize
Disclosure. The FDA and industry stakeholders should assess the
pedigree of training data by analyzing the diversity and reliability of
data sources, the potential for bias, and the extent to which the
appropriateness and accuracy of data sets can be verified. All
stakeholders should acknowledge which variables have been omitted
from training data and anticipate the impact on model predictions.
Low-quality or potentially biased training data should decrease
credibility, and high-quality data sets that are well justified and
appropriate for the population to be analyzed should enhance
credibility. The sources and quality of training data should be disclosed
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with regulatory submissions, and a lack of disclosure should negatively
impact credibility assessments. The pedigree of training data should be
conveyed to healthcare providers and the public through product
labeling.
5. Identify Alternate Methods of Answering Questions of Interest.
Until effective methods for evaluating model credibility become
available and are standardized, agency and industry stakeholders
should identify alternate approaches to answering questions of
interest, and the adoption of computer models should be reserved for
situations in which other methods are unacceptably dangerous or
ineffective. Safety and public health should be prioritized over cost
effectiveness and the desire to innovate, and when alternate methods
have not been assessed and disclosed, stronger evidence should be
required to establish model credibility.
The FDA should incorporate the above recommendations into
future guidance. Taking a more holistic approach to credibility
assessment will build trust in computer models and minimize
algorithmic risks, which include harms broader than physical injury to
patients and research subjects. The FDA defines credibility as a
model’s ability to elicit trust in its predictions. However, the agency
should not overlook its role in building trust. How the FDA adopts and
interprets computer models affects public faith in the technology and
its own credibility. When respect for the FDA may be waning, the
agency should emphasize transparency and increase evidentiary
standards instead of letting them lapse.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the twentieth century, Congress enhanced the FDA’s
powers in response to a series of public health disasters. With each
increase in responsibility, the FDA also enhanced its evidentiary
standards, which earned public trust and improved the agency’s
reputation. However, in the past few decades, the FDA’s evidentiary
standards have decreased, and the agency has made a series of
questionable decisions. Its adoption of computer models and
simulations may exacerbate this trend. In addition to relying on
surrogate endpoints in lieu of direct evidence of symptomatic
improvement, the FDA and its industry partners increasingly rely on
computer models and simulations to augment or replace data from
clinical trials. Though the FDA has drafted guidance to help agency
staff and industry partners assess the credibility of computer models, it
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does not address how models should inform FDA decision making.
Further, it overlooks models that rely on AI, the risks of algorithmic
bias, and the potential for computer models to compound past
injustice.
When adopting proprietary models to make regulatory decisions,
the FDA may effectively delegate legislative power to private parties.
This practice conceals the logic of FDA decisions from public view and
arguably undermines the legitimacy of agency decisions. Until the
Supreme Court revives the nondelegation doctrine and updates it to
address the democratic risks of algorithmic governance, administrative
law may be of little help. In the meantime, before investing further in
computer models, the FDA should enhance existing frameworks for
evaluating model credibility with principles of AI ethics to account for
algorithmic bias and harms. It should follow the example of agencies
that exhibit greater transparency and public participation when
adopting computer models, and it should require similar transparency
from its industry partners.
AI has the potential to streamline aspects of FDA approval,
substitute for dangerous procedures or experiments, and conserve
healthcare resources. However, it can also contribute to bad regulatory
decisions, harm marginalized communities, and impede scientific
progress. In the twentieth century, it took a series of public health
disasters to enhance the FDA’s evidentiary standards. In the twentyfirst, it should not take an algorithmic public health disaster to
implement appropriate safeguards.

